This section constructs the key components of the protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, from the instances of §2: the spending key and the spend-side secrets, the viewing keys, and the diversified addresses. It states each assumption that their security needs at its first use and proves, in Proposition 3.18, four one-way separations between key tiers.
Every derivation of this section is that of a key generated with
The spending key is a uniformly random -bit string,
identified with a -byte string (protocol specification,
§“Constants”). Key generation draws , derives from it the
components of this section, and discards and draws a new one
when
For a spending key , the spend authorising key , the nullifier deriving key and the trapdoor of are
(protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”). The three lead
bytes are rows of Table 4. Key generation discards
if
The scalars and lie in , the scalar field of the Pallas group, because each multiplies a Pallas point: the generator below, the blinding base of (§3.2). The key is an element of the base field .
The three inputs of have distinct lead bytes. By Lemma 2.15, under Assumption 2.12, the triple computed from a uniform , before rejection and before the normalisation below, is therefore computationally indistinguishable from independent uniform elements of , and , up to an additional statistical distance of three reduction distances, each below (§2.3).
Let
compute the point
if its -coordinate is odd, that is, if bit of the star encoding is , replace by ;
let
The spend validating key is the point together with its -coordinate , a field element (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”).
After step 2 the point has even -coordinate. The point
is not , since
The full viewing key of an accepted key is the triple
with the field element of §3.1; the point is recomputed from by the even- lift.
With the key commitment of §2.4 and
Explicitly, let be the Sinsemilla hash point of the -bit message under the domain z.cash:Orchard-CommitIvk-M, and let
be the blinding base; then
Let
Let be uniform on and independent of
, and let
In particular is not uniform on (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, note).
The further rejection condition of key generation concerns the internal key
of ZIP 32, §“Orchard internal key derivation”. That key has the same
and and a trapdoor
A single draw is rejected only if
The proofs of this section analyse a single draw and add the statistical distance bounded by this lemma, under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8.
Let
a -byte string, where encodes the field elements and as -byte little-endian integers. The diversifier key is the first bytes of and the outgoing viewing key the last bytes (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”; row of Table 4). One output of , keyed by the encoding of , yields both.
Equal extracted values come from commitment points ,
with
Hence is bound to the pair , and so is every
address of the key (§3.3): its transmission key
For uniform and independent of every other quantity, is independent of by Lemma “Distribution of ”. The derivation of is keyed by the same , so once or is known that argument no longer applies, and modelling only as a PRF does not restore it: the key of row is also the trapdoor of , outside the hypothesis of Lemma 2.15 (§2.3; protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, note on the use of as both trapdoor and key). The volume states the joint assumption on Pallas scalar multiplication and that the specification proposes as Assumption 3.13.
For keys with
where is uniform on and , are uniform -byte strings, all independent. It is a precise form of the joint assumption that the protocol specification proposes (§“Orchard Key Components”, note); it is not perfect hiding. Results apply it after Lemma 2.15 (Assumption 2.12) has made uniform and independent of , averaging over the key-generation distribution of . It is used by Propositions 3.18, 3.17, 6.10 and 10.6, by Proposition “Confidentiality of the outgoing ciphertext” (§10.3) and by Theorem 12.13.
For an index
the diversifier is
the diversified transmission key is
The address is
The map packs into bytes, eight bits at a
time, least significant bit first (§2.1). Every index
yields an address. The map returns a point for every input, and
replaces the identity by the fixed fallback point,
which is not the identity: the protocol specification types
into the non-identity points.
The fallback case has negligible probability under
Assumption 2.8. Hence
For a uniform -bit key, with the empty tweak on is a pseudorandom permutation: no efficient adversary with oracle access distinguishes it from a uniformly random permutation of (Crypto Guide, §“Pseudorandom functions and permutations”, Definition “Pseudorandom permutation”, and §“Format-preserving encryption and FF1”, Definition “Format-preserving encryption”). It is the security requirement of the protocol specification, §“Pseudo Random Permutations”, whose note records that the distinguishing attack of Dunkelman, Kumar, Lambooij and Sanadhya at this domain size and round count is no better than exhaustive search for the -bit key. It is used so that a diversifier reveals neither its index nor the key that produced it, in Proposition 3.17 (“Unlinkability of diversified addresses”).
Let be a generator of , let and be uniform on and uniform on (§3.2), all independent. The triples and are computationally indistinguishable. With uniform on instead, this is the DDH assumption of the Crypto Guide (§“Diffie–Hellman: computational and decisional”, Definition “Decisional Diffie–Hellman, DDH”). The volume assumes the form with uniform on because is so distributed, and claims no reduction between the two forms; the protocol specification expects the non-uniformity of to cause no security issue (§“Orchard Key Components”, note). It is used by Propositions 3.17 and 10.6 (“Confidentiality and key privacy of note encryption”).
Let two keys be generated independently with
For each the game is modified by a sequence of hops, each changing the adversary’s output distribution by a negligible amount (Crypto Guide, §“The hybrid argument”, Lemma “Hybrid lemma”). Each hop is justified by a reduction that runs the game; the event is efficiently decidable from the diversifiers and has probability at least in every game below, so conditioning on at most doubles each cost.
Each key is replaced by a single draw without rejection (Lemma “Rejection in key generation”, §3.2).
For each key in turn, is replaced by independent uniform elements of the three fields (Lemma 2.15); the reduction derives the remaining components and the addresses.
For each key in turn, is replaced by
(Assumption 3.13); the reduction is given
, generates the other key itself, and computes the game
from the triple. Now and are uniform and independent of all
else, and, except on the negligible events
For
On the inputs of are distinct, since is injective, so under Assumption 2.8 the bases , , are independent uniform points, each , which invokes the fallback, with probability only.
In the last game the adversary’s view consists of , ,
of both keys and , independent of the rest and
identically distributed for
where , are independent and uniform on . The
first two pairs are public keys of the per-key-base ElGamal scheme with
private keys and . For
Figure 1 gives the derivation graph, each edge labelled by its operation, and each one-way edge also by the assumption that makes it one-way. Proposition 3.18 proves four separations: the full viewing key yields no , the incoming viewing key neither nor , the outgoing viewing key no , and an address no .
Let a key be generated honestly with
given the full viewing key , the scalar ;
given the incoming viewing key , the key or the scalar ;
given , the scalar ;
given an address of the key, the scalar .
The hypotheses are: for (a), Assumptions 2.12 (through Lemma 2.15) and 2.22; for (b), those of (a) and, for , Assumption 3.13; for (c), Assumptions 2.12 and 3.13; for (d), Assumptions 2.12, 3.13, 2.8 and 2.22 (“Discrete logarithms on Pallas”). Every part also uses Lemma “Rejection in key generation” (§3.2), under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8. These are the only separations claimed.
By Lemma “Rejection in key generation” (§3.2), a single draw from a uniform replaces the key at a negligible cost. By Lemma 2.15, its triple is then replaced by independent uniform elements of , and , at a further negligible cost: in each part the success of an algorithm is efficiently decidable from the three values, by deriving the remaining components, running the algorithm and comparing its output with the secret. The result is called the idealised key.
(a) Let an algorithm output from
with probability for the idealised key. An algorithm
receives
(b) An algorithm that computes from computes it from
by first deriving , so (a) applies.
Let output from with probability . A
distinguisher for Assumption 3.13, given
of the idealised key and a triple , runs
on and outputs exactly when outputs . On the
real triple it outputs with probability . On the ideal triple
receives and , which is
independent of unless
(c) Let output from with probability . The
distinguisher given and runs on
and outputs exactly when outputs . On the ideal triple,
(d) Let output from the address at an index , possibly of
its choice, with probability . The distinguisher given
and computes
a loss factor of
Of the objects of this section only an address , with the base computed from , is public; , , , , , , the full viewing key, , , and the index are secret key material. One incoming viewing key yields addresses (§3.3), unlinkable in the sense of Proposition 3.17 (“Unlinkability of diversified addresses”).
What a holder of each key can compute from the objects of later sections is stated where those objects are constructed, each with a back-reference to Proposition 3.18: from nullifiers in “Nullifier uniqueness and unlinkability” (§6.4), and from note ciphertexts in “The outgoing ciphertext” (§10.3) and “Trial decryption and note acceptance” (§10.4). This section states no such power.