This section defines the note, its commitment and its extracted commitment, and proves their hiding and binding; it constructs the derivation of all randomness of a created note from one seed under the lead byte , and defines the Action and the bundle as units of a transaction.
The zatoshi is the smallest unit of value; one ZEC, the unit of the native currency of Zcash, is zatoshi (protocol specification, §“Shielded Pools and Notes” and §“Mainnet and Testnet”). Every value in this volume, note values included, is an integer number of zatoshi.
A note is a tuple
the address
the value
the elements
the commitment trapdoor
(protocol specification, §“Shielded Pools and Notes”; the lengths
and are those of §“Constants”). The specification types as an
integer in
A note is never published. A transaction that creates a note publishes its extracted note commitment (Definition 4.4) and a ciphertext of its note plaintext for the recipient, constructed in “Encryption to the recipient” (§10.2) (protocol specification, §“Note Commitments” and §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”). Of the fields of a created note, only appears on chain in the clear: it equals the nullifier that the same Action publishes for its consumed note (“Nullifier chaining”, §6.3). This representation of value serves requirement R1 of §1.4; Propositions 4.5 and 4.8 state what the commitment hides.
The address and the value are the content of the note, its recipient and its amount; the trapdoor randomises its commitment; the elements and , which also enter the commitment, are the note-specific inputs of its nullifier, constructed in “The nullifier” (§6.1).
Let
with and read as integers in
By the routing of §2.4, with the hash point and the blinding base
the commitment is
A sender never publishes : it redraws the note seed (step (vi) of the derivation of §4.3). The extracted commitment is the value an Action publishes for its created note, and the leaf of that note in the pool’s note commitment tree of “The Merkle hash and the tree” (§5.1), whose nodes are elements of .
The blinding base is not : the protocol specification, §“Sinsemilla commitments”, states that is perfectly hiding for a uniform trapdoor, for every domain, which holds only for a blinding base other than (as for , §3.2).
Perfect hiding. Let be uniform on . For
every note content whose message has hash
point
Binding of the extracted commitment. Under
Assumptions 2.22 and 2.8, no efficient
algorithm outputs, except with negligible probability, two notes
Proposition 4.8 states hiding for the trapdoor that a sender derives.
(a) This is Lemma 2.26(i) for the domain and the
message length , whose hypothesis
(b) Step 1 reduces distinct notes to distinct openings. The map
Step 2 treats distinct openings. Let
A created note reaches its recipient as a note plaintext, the byte
string constructed in “The note plaintext” (§10.1) that
the sender encrypts. Its first byte, the lead byte, names the format
of the plaintext and selects the derivation of the note’s randomness. The
sender draws one note seed , a uniform -byte
string, the key type of (§2.3), which
the plaintext carries. The values and of the note and the
ephemeral secret key
The input is an address , a value
checks that
draws uniformly from the -byte strings;
derives
derives
derives
a string of
computes of the note
The output is the note , its seed and (protocol specification, §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”; ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”, §4.7.3).
The order is forced: the string contains , so is derived after . The strings and in are those of the message , packed into bytes, so is a function of and of every committed field . The leading bytes , and are rows of Table 4.
An Ironwood-pool note has the type of Definition “Note” (§4.1) and is committed by the same (Definition 4.4). Every note created by an Ironwood-pool Action, a dummy created note included, has a plaintext with lead byte and the derivations above; no note created by an Orchard-pool Action does. This is the only note-level distinction between the two pools (ZIP 229, “Transaction Format”; ZIP 258, “ZIP 2005 activation”).
An adversary chooses two tuples ,
and and are negligible under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8. The same bound holds with in place of .
Fix the adversary’s tuples. One pass through steps (ii) to (vi) with a
fresh is a trial; its output is
, and it is accepted, event , when
and both terms lie in .
Hybrid 1 replaces the outputs of on
,
and by
independent uniform
In Hybrid 2 the values and are independent, is the
intersection of an event on and an event on , and
is uniform and independent of both. Conditioned on , therefore,
For each , the adversary’s output probability on differs from that
on by at most the rejection probability of a trial as specified (
against ), plus
Negligibility. With uniform strings,
Because is a hash of and of every committed field, Ironwood-pool notes are recoverable in the sense of ZIP 2005. That ZIP proposes, with details subject to change, a Recovery Protocol for recovering Ironwood-pool funds if the Orchard protocol must be disabled because discrete logarithms become computable; a recovery protocol whose statement recomputes by this derivation can bind a note even against an adversary able to compute discrete logarithms (ZIP 2005, Abstract; Rationale, “Proposed Recovery Protocol” and “Repairing note commitments”). Against such an adversary alone is not binding: the discrete-logarithm relations between its bases give a linear equation over with several solutions, hence two distinct notes that open one commitment (ZIP 2005, Rationale, “Attacks against binding of note commitments”). An Orchard-pool note, whose plaintext has lead byte , has instead the trapdoor
row of Table 4, a function of and alone that binds none of , , and (protocol specification, §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”; ZIP 2005, “High-level summary of changes”). It is not a recoverable note: ZIP 2005 calls recoverable the notes created under its format, as deployed the Ironwood-pool notes, and states that recovery would not be possible for funds in the Orchard pool (ZIP 2005, Terminology and Abstract). What the deployed protocol checks of the derivation is stated with the Action statement, defined in “The Action statement” (§9.2).
The specification defines, for each pool, the set of lead bytes allowed in a note plaintext of that pool. For every transaction that contains Actions of the pool, the set is for the Ironwood pool and for the Orchard pool (protocol specification, §“Note Plaintexts and Memo Fields”; ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”, §3.2.1; ZIP 258, “ZIP 2005 activation”). The lead byte travels encrypted, and each decrypting party enforces the rule: decryption with an incoming viewing key, by the recipient, and decryption with an outgoing viewing key, by its holder, both return when the lead byte is not allowed (§“Decryption using an Incoming Viewing Key (Sapling and Orchard)” and §“Decryption using an Outgoing Viewing Key (Sapling and Orchard)”). For an Ironwood-pool output this is check (i) of the acceptance procedure of “Trial decryption and note acceptance” (§10.4). The one consensus check of the lead byte is stated in “Chain state and pool rules” (§11.4).
An Action of a pool consumes one note and creates one note of that pool; it is the specification’s Action transfer, and every Action has both sides (protocol specification, §“Action Transfers and their Descriptions”). Its public data carry the extracted commitment of the created note (Definition 4.4), the nullifier of the consumed note (“The nullifier”, §6.1), a randomised validating key with a spend-authorisation signature (“Randomised validating keys”, §7.2), a net value commitment (“Value commitments”, §8.1), and the ciphertexts of “Encryption to the recipient” (§10.2). “Action descriptions and bundles” (§11.1) assembles them and redefines neither the Action nor the bundle. The relation that each Action must satisfy is the Action statement, defined in “The Action statement” (§9.2).
Every Action has one consumed and one created note, so that its public fields are the same whether a side is real or not; a side that a payment does not use carries a dummy note, a note of value . A dummy consumed note is built as follows (protocol specification, §“Dummy Notes (Orchard)”; ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”, §4.8.3):
set
derive and under the lead byte chosen as for a created note of the pool (ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”, §4.8.3); in the Ironwood pool the lead byte is and the derivations are steps (iv) and (v) of §4.3;
compute by Definition 4.4, and repeat from
the draw of with a fresh seed if
Its nullifier is computed as for any note (“The nullifier”, §6.1). For step (iii) the two sources differ: the specification’s section chooses the lead byte with the pool fixed to the Orchard pool, which gives also in the Ironwood pool, whereas ZIP 2005, §4.8.3, makes the choice identical for dummy and non-dummy notes. The volume follows the ZIP. No condition of the Action statement checks the derivation of (Definition 9.2, Remark “What the statement does not check”).
A dummy created note is a created note of value , built as any created note; in the Ironwood pool it therefore carries lead byte . Its address depends on the flag of the bundle (“Bundle flags”, §9.1).
When
When
That the public data do not reveal which sides of an Action are real is part of Theorem 12.13 (§12.4).
The bundle of a pool in a transaction, which ZIP 229 calls the pool’s component, is the sequence of that pool’s Actions in the transaction together with the bundle-level data that later sections attach: one anchor (“Anchors”, §5.2), one balancing value (“The balancing value”, §8.2), one binding signature (“The binding signature”, §8.3), the flags (“Bundle flags”, §9.1) and one proof for all its Actions (“The Action circuit and the Halo 2 proof”, §9.3). A transaction carries at most one bundle per pool (ZIP 229, “Transaction Format”).