This section constructs the net value commitment of an Action, defines the transparent transaction value pool, the balancing value of each pool and the fee, and constructs the binding signature. Proposition 8.11 keeps apart an algebraic identity, under which the binding validating key is a known multiple of the randomness base exactly when a pool balances modulo , and a knowledge statement, under which a valid binding signature forces balance modulo .
Requirement R4 of “Requirements on a shielded payment” (§1.4) is met through the additive homomorphism of the Pedersen commitment (Crypto Guide, §“The Pedersen commitment”, Theorem “Additive homomorphism”). Each Action publishes a commitment to its net value; the group sum of a bundle’s commitments commits to the sum of the net values under the sum of the trapdoors, and a verifier compares that sum with the bundle’s public balancing value (§8.2) without learning any single value.
Let an Action consume a note of value and create a note of
value , both in
The value base and the randomness base are
the value-commitment rows of Table 3. For a trapdoor
(protocol specification, §“Homomorphic Pedersen commitments (Sapling and Orchard)”).
Both bases have order : the protocol specification types them as points of order (§“Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”), a set that excludes (§“Pallas and Vesta”). The specification defines on the signed integers
(§“Commitment”), and a signed integer enters the scalar multiplication
as its residue modulo (§2.1). Reduction
modulo is injective on this domain, since two of its elements
differ by at most
For each Action the author of the transaction draws uniformly from , by , independently of every other value (protocol specification, §“Sending Notes (Orchard)” and §“Homomorphic Pedersen commitments (Sapling and Orchard)”). Unlike , and , which are derived from the note seed (§4.3), the trapdoor is derived from no note, and no note field, note plaintext (§10.1) or transaction field (§11.2) contains it. The author retains every of the bundle; together they determine the binding signing key (§8.3).
The specification types the trapdoor as an integer in
With
Perfect hiding: for uniform on and independent of , the commitment is uniform on , whatever is.
Computational binding: under Assumptions 2.22
and 2.8, no efficient algorithm outputs, except with
negligible probability, pairs and of an integer
and a trapdoor with
(i) This is the Crypto Guide’s Theorem “Perfect hiding”
(§“The Pedersen commitment”). Since
a relation with non-zero coefficient
Transparent inputs and transparent outputs are the cleartext value transfers of a transaction outside every shielded pool, with public amounts. Each transaction has a transparent transaction value pool: its transparent inputs add their values to it, and its transparent outputs remove theirs. The balancing value of each shielded pool, defined next for the two pools of the Orchard protocol, is also added to it (protocol specification, §“Transactions and Treestates”).
For each pool of the Orchard protocol, the Orchard pool or the Ironwood pool,
the balancing value of a
transaction is its declared net value, in zatoshi, of the notes of the pool
that it consumes minus those that it creates: a signed integer in
In a correctly constructed transaction, equals the sum of the net values of the pool’s Actions. A verifier cannot check this equation directly, since each is hidden in its ; the binding signature (§8.3) enforces it.
The protocol specification, §“Transactions and Treestates”, states the
consensus rule: the value remaining in the transparent transaction value
pool must be non-negative. For a transaction other than a coinbase
transaction (Definition “Coinbase transaction”, §11.2) the
remaining value is the transaction fee (ibid.); no transaction field
encodes it (ZIP 229, “Transaction Format” and “Non-requirements”). The
pool of a coinbase transaction also receives, as implicit inputs, the block
subsidy and the fees of the block’s other transactions, and its outputs must
consume all of the value in it (protocol specification, §“Transactions and
Treestates” and §“Transaction Consensus Rules”). From NU7 it receives
only part of the fees: for the total fee of the block’s other
transactions, , computed once for the block, is
removed from circulation, and the coinbase transaction receives
where is a sum of per-component contributions, in which each Ironwood-pool Action contributes one (the contribution ). The fee of the worked payment is computed in Example 11.16 (§11.5).
The balancing value is cleartext, so a negative one discloses the amount that enters the pool; the field names no receiving note or address.
A transaction has one transparent input, of zatoshi, ZEC, and of at most bytes, no transparent output, and an Ironwood-pool bundle of two Actions, which creates one note , of the whole amount less a fee of zatoshi, and one dummy note; its balancing value is
A later transaction has no transparent input, an Ironwood-pool bundle
of two Actions whose balancing value is , and one transparent
output, of zatoshi and of at most bytes, which leaves a
fee of zatoshi. Both fees are conventional: for the total sizes
and in bytes of a transaction’s
transparent inputs and outputs, ZIP 317 adds to
the transparent contribution , which is for each transaction, so
with its two Actions each fee is
It does not learn that consumed . Under the preconditions of Theorem 12.13 (“Privacy”, §12.4), the public data of the bundle of are computationally indistinguishable from those of a bundle with the same public leakage that consumes other leaves of the tree at its anchor, notes of other values included, while stays unconsumed. In particular the extracted commitment of hides its recipient and value (Proposition 4.8), a nullifier of is not linkable to a leaf (Proposition 6.10), and the anchor of confines its consumed notes only to the leaves of the anchored tree (Remark “Anchor choice as public data”, §5.2). The equal amounts are a correlation, which an observer may weigh with the timing of the two transactions and with how rarely the amount occurs; they are not a path from the leaf of to a nullifier of , which the public data do not contain. ZIP 229, Privacy Implications, records this disclosure of the amounts that cross between pools.
Fix a pool of the Orchard protocol and a transaction whose bundle for that
pool has
The binding signing key of the bundle is
(protocol specification, §“Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”). By the additive homomorphism (Crypto Guide, §“The Pedersen commitment”, Theorem “Additive homomorphism”),
| (6) |
the integer sum entering as its residue modulo .
The verifier computes, from public fields only, the binding validating key
where the subtracted point is , the commitment with zero trapdoor, and , an element of the domain of , enters as its residue modulo . No transaction field encodes (protocol specification, §“Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”).
An opening of a net value commitment is a
pair of an integer and a scalar
For the bundle fixed above:
Identity. If
hence
Knowledge. Let be an opening of
for every , and let
is the discrete logarithm of to the base , a relation between two values of .
Consequently, under Assumptions 2.22, 2.8
and 7.3, an efficient party that outputs the net value
commitments and the balancing value of a bundle, openings of
every and a binding signature under the resulting
on a message of its choice satisfies
(i) Expanding each by
Definition 8.2 and applying the additive homomorphism
gives (6); subtracting
gives the identity. Since
has prime order , the point
is if and only if
(ii) By the homomorphism,
and is invertible modulo the prime . This is Part 2 of the
proof of the Crypto Guide’s Theorem “The binding signature is a
proof of knowledge of ” (§“Binding signatures as a proof of
knowledge of a discrete logarithm”), with
Consequence. Let an efficient party output, with probability
, a bundle’s net value commitments and balancing value, openings
of every commitment, a message and a binding signature on it under the
resulting , with non-zero modulo ; this event
is efficiently decidable from the output. If
The openings are obtained, and the congruence is promoted to an equality of integers, in Lemma 12.3 and Theorem 12.4 (§12.1).
The binding signature scheme is the binding-signature instance of RedPallas (§7.1): RedPallas on the base , without key re-randomisation; its base differs from the spend-authorisation base . The author of the transaction computes from the trapdoors it retains and signs with it; the verifier recomputes from the public fields and validates the signature under it (protocol specification, §“Binding Signature (Sapling and Orchard)” and §“Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”). The signed message is the signature digest constructed in “Transaction digests and signatures” (§11.3); which transaction data the signatures fix is stated there, in Proposition 11.10.
For an honestly constructed bundle with
The construction runs once for each pool of the Orchard protocol. A transaction carries a balancing value and a binding signature, bindingSigOrchard or bindingSigIronwood, for each pool whose bundle has at least one Action. Each pool’s sums only that pool’s net value commitments and subtracts only that pool’s balancing value; both pools use with the bases and , and . The consensus rule of the protocol specification, §“Transaction Consensus Rules” (ZIP 229, “Consensus Rules”), is: if a pool’s bundle has Actions, its binding signature must be a valid signature of under that pool’s . Validation rejects a non-canonical encoding of the signature’s point component (§7.1; protocol specification, §“RedDSA, RedJubjub, and RedPallas”).