This section adds no theorem: it lists the verifier’s checks in the order he performs them, assembles the implication chain from an accepted proof back to the claim, each link labelled by the statement that proves it and by its error term, repeats the chain for the Orchard Action circuit, and maps the five reductions of §1.2 to the formal statements that own them. Nothing here depends on the recursion of §7, which Orchard does not deploy.
The verifier of the toy holds the fixed data of the circuit, the five selector polynomials and the permuted-label polynomials of Construction 2.10; the public input, the column (0, 0, 0, − 35) interpolated to PI (X) (§4.2); and the proof. The proof is a byte string (§4.3): commitments, claimed evaluations, and one opening, in the order of the phases of §4.5 (Table 10), counted by kind in Table 8. He never sees a column polynomial, a blinder or the advice; he sees curve points and field elements, and he performs the checks below in this order.
The challenges. He first commits to the instance column
himself, from the public input and with the fixed blinder 1
(§4.2), so that the public input never comes
from the prover. He then replays the transcript
(§4.3): he absorbs the key digest, that instance
commitment and each prover message in turn, and squeezes every
challenge at its prescribed point. In the toy the point
The identity at the point. From the claimed evaluations
and the fixed polynomials he evaluates himself, he forms both sides
of the gate identity. In the toy this is the one field
equation (5):
The wiring. He evaluates the boundary and update identities
of the permutation argument (7) at the point
and, in the deployed form, the chunk-boundary identities of
§2.6 and the boundary identity
The tables. He evaluates the four lookup
identities (9) and, in the deployed form,
the boundary identity
The openings. Every evaluation he received for the three
checks above was claimed. He now binds each claim to its
commitment: the multipoint reduction of
Construction 4.4 folds every claim into one
statement, and the inner-product equation (29)
discharges it with one multi-scalar multiplication of length n . In
the toy, the opening of a (X) at
If every check passes he accepts. The accepted checks imply the following chain, read backwards from the last check to the first; Figure 18 draws it.
The identity check passed at his random point. Because the
commitment binds, the polynomials behind the openings were fixed
before the point was chosen: the Pedersen vector commitment is
binding under the discrete logarithm on Vesta (the Crypto
Guide, §“Pedersen vector commitments”, recalled in
§2.9), and the opening argument is knowledge
sound (Theorem 3.5 and
Corollary 3.13), so from any prover who passes the
opening an extractor recovers the committed vector and the value it
opens to, or else a discrete-logarithm relation among the hashed
generators; its knowledge error is O (log d / | F |) , and the
multipoint reduction that fed it adds one Schwartz–Zippel allowance
of order n / | F | (Lemma 4.5). With a
hash in place of coins the ordering holds by construction, every
commitment being an input of the hash that produced the challenge
testing it (§4.3). Because the point was random and a
false identity disagrees with the true one at all but deg D
points, passing supports
The identity holds as polynomials. Then
The permutation identities passed. Except with the error
2 N / | F | of Theorem 2.11 over
The public input fixed the target at 35 . In the toy, 35 enters the gate polynomial G through PI (X) , which the verifier interpolates himself (§4.2), so it enters the identity of link 1. In the deployed circuit the instance polynomial π (X) of Definition 4.2 is the verifier’s own: he committed to it from the values he intends to verify against, and its designated cells are copy-constrained to the advice cells that carry the same values, so the permutation of link 3 forces agreement. There is no error term of its own. The relation certified is the one at the public input the verifier supplied (§4.2).
Together with the observation that closed §2.1, that
filling the advice columns is knowing the witness, because those cells
are the wires carrying it and its powers, the four links say: there
exists an assignment of the advice columns, a value of the witness, making the
entire arithmetisation of
The chain so far establishes that satisfying advice exists. That the prover knows it is the extraction question. The extractor of Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.13 recovers, from any prover who passes the opening, the committed vector and its blinder: it establishes knowledge of committed polynomial data, and nothing more. It does not by itself prove that those polynomials encode a satisfying circuit witness; that is the upper layer’s task in the layered extraction of Remark 4.12, where the commitment scheme’s extractor turns commitments into polynomials and the polynomial IOP’s extractor turns polynomials into a witness. Under the composed hypotheses named there, a round-by-round or state-restoration knowledge-soundness theorem for the IOP, extractability and evaluation binding for the commitment scheme, and a multi-round Fiat–Shamir theorem for the transcript, an extractor for the full protocol obtains such a witness; §5 weighs those hypotheses against the deployed transcript, and in particular states in which model the tight bound is proved.
For the interactive protocol and an honest verifier the transcript
reveals nothing beyond the truth of the statement
(Proposition 4.10,
cited, and Corollary 4.11); for the
non-interactive deployed proof this is stated, not proved
(§4.6). Every
commitment the prover sent is a uniform group element (perfect hiding,
recalled in §4.6); the verifying key’s and the instance
commitments carry the fixed blinding factor 1 and commit only public
data; the evaluations
of each blinded column are uniform by
Lemma 4.9; the final scalar of the
opening, which folding alone would have leaked as a linear form of the
coefficients (Remark 3.7), is masked by the random
polynomial s (X) vanishing at the opening point
(§3.6, in the deployed form of §3.8); and
the joint transcript is simulated by the
witness-free simulator of Proposition 4.10, within the
distance of Corollary 4.11 for the deployed
challenges.
The toy has no blinding rows and is not zero knowledge: its claimed
value
The verifier has checked a small transcript,
Nothing in the chain used that the statement was small. Replace the
four gates by the constraints of the Orchard Action statement, the nine
conditions the protocol specification imposes on the public input and
the witness (protocol specification,
§ 4.18.4,
“Action Statement (Orchard)”): the integrity of the old and new note
commitments, the Merkle path from the spent commitment to the anchor
unless the spent value is 0 (the Crypto Guide, §“Merkle trees
and commitments to sets”),
the opening of the net value commitment, a Pedersen commitment to the
value difference (the Crypto Guide, §“The Pedersen
commitment”), the nullifier’s derivation, the spend authority, that
the randomised verification key rk is the re-randomisation of the
spend validating key ak by a witnessed randomiser (the
Crypto Guide, §“Key re-randomisation and unlinkability”), the
integrity of the diversified address, that the spent note’s address
(g d, pk d) satisfies
| the toy | the Orchard Action | |
|---|---|---|
| field | F 97 | F p Pallas , a prime of 255 bits |
| commitment group | y 2 = x 3 + 3 over F 79 , 97 points (§3.7) | Vesta, of order p Pallas (§3.8) |
| rows | n = 4 , H = { 1, 22, 96, 75 } | n = 2 11 = 2048 |
| columns | 3 advice, 5 selectors, 1 instance | 10 advice, 29 fixed, 1 instance (§4.1) |
| gates | one universal gate (1), degree 3 , rotation 0 | custom gates at rotations, d max = 9 (Definition 2.7; the deployed value, §4.1.4) |
| identity | G = t Z H ; deg G = 9 , deg t = 5 | C = h Z H with C the y -combination; deg h ≤ 16375 , 8 chunks (Theorem 4.7) |
| wiring | a permutation of twelve cells, four copy classes ( b 3 , c 3 fixed), one running product (§2.6) | fifteen equality-enabled columns, three running products |
| table facts | none on the grid; Example 2.13 | three lookup arguments into a 2 10 -row Sinsemilla table (§4.1.3) |
| the point | z = 20 , by decree | x squeezed from the BLAKE2b transcript (§4.3) |
| one-term error | 11 / 97 ; 3 / 97 for the c 0 = 10 cheat | about 2 − 240 ; 2 − 176 after 2 64 grinding attempts |
| openings | a, b, c, t at z ; four cross-term points and S per opening (§3.7) | 49 claimed evaluations per Action and 45 shared, one opening of 23 points (Tables 10 and 8; the collapse, Construction 4.4) |
| proof | — | 2720 + 2272 a bytes, 4992 for one Action (Table 8) |
For the verification of an Action proof that the consensus rules require (protocol specification, § 4.6, “Action Descriptions”), the randomised polynomial-identity test of link 1 is the algebraic core: a Schwartz–Zippel argument on one identity at one hashed point. The full verifier of §4.5 evaluates that identity’s permutation and lookup summands from the claimed evaluations, binds every claimed evaluation through the multipoint reduction, recomputes every transcript challenge, and closes the single inner-product equation with its one multi-scalar multiplication of length n , before concluding that the circuit’s constraints hold at the public input it verified against, the anchor, the net value commitment, the nullifier, the randomised verification key, the extracted note commitment and the flags of §4.2. Under the knowledge soundness whose status §5 classifies (designed-but-unspecified for the deployed transcript), an accepted Action proof certifies, for a known witness, that the constraints of the circuit whose verifying key the consensus rules fix (protocol specification, § 4.6) hold. That these imply the conditions of the Action statement (protocol specification, § 4.18.4) is a property of that circuit, which this volume does not verify and which the specification records as having failed for the Orchard circuit deployed before NU6.2 (the same section); value balance additionally requires the binding signature (protocol specification, § 4.14, “Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”), and privacy rests also on components outside the proof, such as note encryption.
Each of the five reductions of §1.2, “The chain of reductions”, is owned by a formal statement. Table 12 lists, reduction by reduction, what the toy exhibited and which statement carries it; the last two rows point beyond the spine, to the extractor that turns existence into knowledge and to the recursion, which Orchard does not deploy and on which nothing above depends.
| reduction | the toy exhibits | the statement that owns it |
|---|---|---|
| computation → grid | Table 1, Figure 2; knowing the witness is filling the advice | Definition 2.7 (§2.1, §2.5) |
| grid → polynomials | the nine interpolants; G of degree 9 vanishing on H | Theorem 2.1 (§2.2) |
| vanishing → identity | t = G / Z H of degree 5 ; the gap D = 24 (1 + X + X 2 + X 3) | Theorem 2.2 (§2.3) |
| identity → one random check | z = 20 accepted; 3 / 97 and 11 / 97 ; Figure 4 | Theorem 2.5 (§2.4); Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.7 (§4.5) |
| random check → committed openings | ||
| binding | a = (90, 61, 22, 24) sealed in P = (39, 25) | the Crypto Guide, §“Pedersen vector commitments”, recalled in §2.9 |
| the opening | Tables 4 and 5; v ′ = 60 rejected | Construction 3.2, Theorem 3.3, Lemma 3.4, Theorem 3.5, Corollary 3.13 (§3) |
| the wiring | product 1 honest, 61 with b 1 = 4 | Theorem 2.11 (§2.6) |
| the tables | 82 = 82 ; the forged 7 stranded | Theorem 2.15 (§2.8) |
| the public 35 | PI = (0, 0, 0, − 35) | Definition 4.2 (§4.2) |
| the removed verifier | z by decree against x by hash; Q ε | the Crypto Guide, §“The Fiat–Shamir transform: from interactive to non-interactive”, applied in §4.3 |
| many openings, one | — | Construction 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 (§4.4) |
| hiding | the leaked linear form; c = 20 against c ′ = 46 | Remark 3.7 and the mask (§3.6, §3.8); Lemma 4.9 (§4.6) |
| the pattern | — | Remark 4.12 and “The map onto the phases” (§4.7) |
| “the prover knows the witness” | — | the extractor in the algebraic group model and the Fiat–Shamir loss (§5, “The algebraic group model”) |
| beyond the spine | — | the accumulation fold, Proposition 7.6, the accumulation scheme cited as Theorem 7.5, and recursion over the cycle of curves, none deployed by Orchard, which uses one direction of the cycle only (§7.3, “Accumulation and the Halo trick”; §7.4, “The half Orchard uses”) |