This section shows that the membership exemption of Orchard dummy notes is unsound once the value base of an Action is a witness, and defines the Split Inputs that replace dummy consumed notes for Custom Assets (§4.1); constructs the split nullifier and proves its independence from the nullifier of the copied note (§4.2); states the OrchardZSA Action statement as a delta on the Orchard one, with named conditions (§4.3); states the assumptions on its proof and proves that a Split Input requires the spend authority of the copied note (§4.4); and defines the Action Group (§4.5). The objects of the section are taken from ZIP 226 and ZIP 228, both Draft, with the rules of ZIP 227 that bound the number of Action Groups. The Orchard objects they modify are those of the Ironwood Guide and are cited, not restated.
By the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Dummy notes” (§“Actions,
bundles, and dummy notes”), an Action whose consumed side is unused
consumes a dummy note of value 0 : under a fresh key or, when
Let R − be the relation obtained from the Ironwood Guide’s
Definition “Orchard Action statement” by adding an auxiliary input
| cv net = [v old − v new] A + [rcv] R Orchard, |
as in Definition 3.8; condition A3 and conditions A5 to A10
are unchanged, so a consumed note of value 0 is exempt from membership
whatever A is. Then for every
Action 1 witnesses
Action 2 witnesses
More generally, a witnessed base
The point [− 1] V Orchard is not O , since
V Orchard has prime order p Vesta , so Action 1 is well
typed. Both consumed notes have value 0 , so A3 holds for both Actions
without a path, and A8 holds for either value of enableSpends ;
A9 holds with
| cv 1 net | = [0 − v] ([− 1] V Orchard) + [rcv 1] R Orchard = [v] V Orchard + [rcv 1] R Orchard, | ||
| cv 2 net | = [0 − v] V Orchard + [rcv 2] R Orchard . |
With balancing value 0 and no burn, the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Binding validating key” gives
| bvk = cv 1 net + cv 2 net = [rcv 1 + rcv 2] R Orchard, |
whose discrete logarithm
Let
| Extract P (NoteCommit rcm OrchardZSA (n)) |
(Definition 3.2) is a leaf of the note commitment tree
under the anchor of the consuming Action, consumed by an Action that sets
the witness bit
Padding rule. In a bundle (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Bundle”) of OrchardZSA Actions, for each Custom Asset whose Asset Base B has fewer consumed notes than created notes, the sender gives each input-less Action of B a Split Input of B (ZIP 226, “Split Notes”). Actions of ZEC keep the dummy consumed notes of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Dummy notes”; Actions of Custom Assets take no dummy consumed note (ZIP 226, “Backward Compatibility”). Both regimes occur within one bundle of OrchardZSA Actions. That bundle is not the Orchard-pool bundle of a version- 6 transaction: version 6 is the format of ZIP 229, which carries no ZSA fields (ZIP 229, “Non-requirements”). ZIP 226 enforces in the statement that every consumed note of a Custom Asset, split or not and of any value, is a leaf: “for Custom Assets we enforce that every input note to an OrchardZSA Action must be proven to exist in the set of note commitments” (“Rationale for Split Notes”). The condition is constructed in “The OrchardZSA Action statement” (§4.3), and Corollary 9.4, in “Security”, states what it yields for the Asset Base of the created note.
ZIP 226, “Split Notes”, lets the sender copy one of three notes of Asset Base B :
another note of B consumed by a real spend in the same bundle, but not by this Split Input;
a different unspent note of B , which is not thereby spent;
an already spent note of B , the zeroed value preventing a second spend.
It states that “we do not care about whether the previously issued note
copied to create a Split Input is owned by the sender, or whether it was
nullified before”. Proposition 4.12, in “The
OrchardZSA Action proof” (§4.4), states which of these
choices are available to a sender who does not hold the spend authority of
the copied note. Under Remark 1.7, if OrchardZSA notes
are in the Orchard pool, which ZIP 258, “Consensus rules from NU6.3
activation”, restricts to Actions with
An OrchardZSA note consumed by a real spend, with
| nf = DeriveNullifier nk (ρ, ψ, cm) = Extract P ([(PRF nk nfOrchard (ρ) + ψ) mod p Pallas] K Orchard + cm), |
with
A Split Action publishes one nullifier, which enters the nullifier set of its pool, and a nullifier must not repeat, either within a transaction or across the block chain (Ironwood Guide, §“Nullifier sets”; protocol specification, §“Nullifier Sets”). The copied note may be unspent, choice (2) of Remark 4.3, or spent in the same bundle, choice (1). Publishing its nullifier would, in the first case, make it unspendable and, in the second, repeat a nullifier within the transaction, which invalidates the transaction. The nullifier of a Split Input must therefore differ from that of the copied note. ZIP 226 states the purpose of the change as privacy: it is made “to prevent the identification of notes” (“Circuit Statement”).
Let
| L Orchard := GroupHash (z.cash:Orchard, L), |
the input of the second row of Table 3. For a Split Input with nullifier deriving key nk , element ρ old and commitment cm old , the sender draws rseed _ nf uniformly from B Y [32] and sets
| ψ nf := ToBase (PRFexpand rseed _ nf ([0x0A] ∥ I2LEOSP 256 (ρ old))) ∈ F p Pallas . |
The split nullifier is
| nf old := Extract P ([(PRF nk nfOrchard (ρ old) + ψ nf) mod p Pallas] K Orchard + cm old + L Orchard) . |
Against the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Nullifier” there are two changes: ψ old is replaced by the fresh ψ nf , and the fixed point L Orchard is added before extraction. The derivation adds one row to that volume’s Construction “Domain bytes of PRF expansion”:
| b | Key κ | Remainder t ′ | f | Output | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0x0A | rseed _ nf | I2LEOSP 256 (ρ old) | ToBase | ψ nf | §4.2 |
The key rseed _ nf is secret, uniform and used once. The byte 0x0A is reserved for this use by ZIP 2005’s amendment of §“Sending Notes (Orchard)” (ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”; ZIP 226, “Split Notes”); the specification’s own list of expansion uses (§“Pseudo Random Functions”) does not record it, and ZIP 2005’s amendment of that list adds 0x0A and 0x0B . It differs from the bytes 0x04 of esk , 0x05 and 0x0B of rcm and 0x09 of ψ of the Orchard sending derivations (protocol specification, §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”; Definition 3.5). Class: specified, as a sender rule; Remark 4.8 states what the statement enforces.
Let n be an OrchardZSA note with commitment
Under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions “GroupHash as a
random oracle” and “Discrete logarithms on Pallas”, no efficient
algorithm outputs nk , a note n with the opening of its commitment,
and
Let rseed _ nf be uniform and used only for this
derivation, and let
| ε expand + ε ToBase + δ, |
where ε expand bounds the Ironwood Guide’s
Assumption “Pseudorandomness of PRF expansion” for one query,
Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified construction. Part (ii) concerns honest senders, since the statement does not enforce the derivation (Remark 4.8).
(i) Write
| s := (PRF nk nfOrchard (ρ) + ψ) mod p Pallas, s ′ := (PRF nk nfOrchard (ρ) + ψ ′) mod p Pallas, |
and
| L + [s ′ − s] K = O ; |
with the sign − ,
| L + [s + s ′] K + [2] cm = O . |
Given its opening,
(ii) The hybrids follow the proof of the Ironwood Guide’s
Proposition “Nullifier unlinkability”. First,
PRFexpand rseed _ nf , evaluated at the single input
[0x0A] ∥ I2LEOSP 256 (ρ) , is replaced by a
uniform 64 -byte string, at cost ε expand : the key is
used nowhere else, and the rest of the game is an efficient function of the
answer and of (n, nk) . Second, ToBase of that uniform
string is replaced by a uniform
In the model of the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “GroupHash as a
random oracle”, the event
The statement is defined as a delta on the relation R Action of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Orchard Action statement”, itself a relation in the sense of the Crypto Guide’s Definition “Language, relation, witness” (§“Languages, relations, and witnesses”). Notation, types and conditions not named below are those of that definition; conditions A6 to A9 are cited by name and not restated.
Base. The seven components of the primary input of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Orchard Action statement” other than disableCrossAddress , and its conditions A1 to A9. The input disableCrossAddress and condition A10 are omitted (Remark 4.7).
Primary input.
| pub = (rt, cv net, nf old, rk, cmx, enableSpends, enableOutputs, enableZSA), |
with the first seven components typed as in the cited definition and
Auxiliary input. The auxiliary input aux of the cited definition, together with
| AssetBase ∈ E ∗, is _ native _ asset ∈ { 0, 1 }, split _ flag ∈ { 0, 1 }, ψ nf ∈ F p Pallas . |
Notation. Let
Relation. The relation R ActionZSA is the set of pairs (pub, aux) of the types above that satisfy the following conditions.
Old note commitment integrity:
| NoteCommit rcm old OrchardZSA ((g d old) ⋆, (pk d old) ⋆, v old, ρ old, ψ old, AssetBase) | ||
| ∈ { cm old, ⊥ } . |
New note commitment integrity:
| Extract P ⊥ (NoteCommit rcm new OrchardZSA ((g d new) ⋆, (pk d new) ⋆, v new, ρ new, ψ new, AssetBase)) | ||
| ∈ { cmx, ⊥ }, |
with
Native indicator:
Pause: if
Merkle path validity:
Value commitment integrity:
| cv net | = ValueCommit rcv OrchardZSA (AssetBase, v ′ − v new) | ||
| = [v ′ − v new] AssetBase + [rcv] R Orchard, |
a variable-base multiplication by the witnessed AssetBase (Definition 3.8).
Split only for Custom Assets: if
Nullifier integrity: if
| nf old = DeriveNullifier nk (ρ old, ψ old, cm old) ; |
if
| nf old = Extract P ( | [(PRF nk nfOrchard (ρ old) + ψ nf) mod p Pallas] K Orchard | ||
| + cm old + L Orchard), |
the split nullifier of Construction 4.4.
Spend authority and diversified address integrity: unchanged and unconditional; no factor of split _ flag relaxes them.
Enable spend flag and enable output flag: unchanged; A8 reads v old , not v ′ , and A9 reads v new .
(ZIP 226, “Circuit Statement”, paragraphs “Asset Base Equality”, “The enableZSA Flag”, “Value Commitment Correctness” and “Asset Identifier Consistency for Split Actions”; ZIP 226, “Split Notes” and “Note Structure and Commitment”; protocol specification, §“Action Statement (Orchard)”.) Class: specified at statement level; its status is stated in Remark 4.7.
One witness. Conditions A1′, A2′ and A4′ use the single witnessed AssetBase , so the consumed and the created note of an Action have one Asset Base, and its net value commitment is on that base.
Native branch. By C1 and the case split of
Definition 3.2, an Action with
Pause. With
Membership. Since
Split Actions. By A4′ the copied value never enters
cv net . By A8, which reads v old , a Split
Action that copies a note of non-zero value requires
These consequences are direct from the cited definitions and from the Ironwood Guide’s Remark “ ⊥ -weakened conditions”, with Assumption 4.9 in place of that volume’s knowledge-soundness assumption (ZIP 226, “Circuit Statement” and “Overview”). Table 5 pairs each condition with the Orchard condition it replaces and its ZIP 226 paragraph; Figure 1 draws the new witnesses and the conditions that read them.
| Condition | Replaces | ZIP 226, “Circuit Statement”, paragraph |
|---|---|---|
| A1′ | A1 | “Asset Base Equality” |
| A2′ | A2 | “Asset Base Equality” |
| C1 | none | “Asset Base Equality” (the witness is _ native _ asset ) |
| C2 | none | “The enableZSA Flag” |
| A3′ | A3 | “Asset Identifier Consistency for Split Actions” (Merkle Path Validity) |
| A4′ | A4 | “Value Commitment Correctness”; “Asset Identifier Consistency for Split Actions” ( v ′ ) |
| C3 | none | “Asset Identifier Consistency for Split Actions” |
| A5′ | A5 | “Asset Identifier Consistency for Split Actions” (Nullifier Integrity), with “Split Notes” for the formula and “Note Structure and Commitment” for split _ flag = 0 |
| A6 to A9 | themselves | none (unchanged) |
| A10 | omitted | none (Remark 4.7) |
The delta is specified at statement level (ZIP 226, Draft, “Circuit Statement”). ZIP 226 states it against the specification’s statement, which still has seven primary inputs and conditions A1 to A9 (protocol specification, §“Action Statement (Orchard)”). The current Orchard statement has the eighth primary input disableCrossAddress and condition A10 (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Orchard Action statement” and Remark “Status”; ZIP 258, “Consensus rules from NU6.3 activation”), which ZIP 226 never mentions; the specification fixes that input, and the meaning of the flag that A10 formalises, only in §“Action Descriptions”. The composition of the delta with A10 is therefore an open problem (Definition 1.2). The statement uses enableZSA , which ZIP 226 never lists as a primary input. The encoded instance of the current Orchard statement has ten elements, the nine that encode its first seven primary inputs and disableCrossAddress (Ironwood Guide, §“The Action statement”); no normative text fixes the position of disableCrossAddress in it or places enableZSA in it, so the position of enableZSA is an open problem. ZIP 226 defers “All modifications in the Circuit” to an unversioned document outside the ZIPs, “Modifications to the Orchard circuit for the OrchardZSA Protocol”; no ZIP fixes a complete OrchardZSA circuit, which is designed but unspecified. The reading of A8 on v old is specified by the delta, which leaves A8 unchanged; only its confirmation in that circuit document is designed but unspecified, and Table 7 records it.
Items (i) to (iii) of the Ironwood Guide’s Remark “What the statement does not check” carry over. In addition:
The witness ψ nf is constrained only through
A5′ to the published nullifier. For
The derivations of rcm and ψ from rseed are unchecked, as for Orchard.
The witnessed AssetBase is checked only against the consumed leaf, through A1′ and A3′, and never against a record of issued Assets. Lemma 9.3, in “Security”, concerns the leaves.
The statement does not check that the prover owns the copied note of a Split Input beyond A6 and A7; this is the subject of Proposition 4.12.
(ZIP 226, “Split Notes” and “Circuit Statement”.)
The Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions “Knowledge soundness of the Action proof” and “Zero knowledge of the Action proof” name the relation R Action and its verifying key. The corresponding assumptions for R ActionZSA are stated here in the same form; the OrchardZSA verifying key denotes the verifying key of a circuit for R ActionZSA , which no ZIP names.
Let the hash of the Fiat–Shamir transform be modelled as a random oracle.
For every efficient adversary that outputs primary inputs
| π is accepted for (pub 1, ..., pub n) under the OrchardZSA verifying key | ||
| and (pub i, aux i) ∉ R ActionZSA for some i |
is negligible. This is the knowledge-soundness clause of the Crypto Guide’s Definition “SNARK” (§“SNARKs: succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge”) for the relation of Definition 4.6, for a Halo 2 proof (Halo 2 Guide, §“The Halo 2 proof system” and §“A rigorous treatment of knowledge soundness”), the primary input bound to the proof as in the Halo 2 Guide, §“Instance columns and binding the public statement”. It includes that every satisfying assignment of the circuit yields a witness of R ActionZSA ; in particular, the multiplication of A4′ is by the witnessed AssetBase and nothing else. No ZIP names the circuit or the verifying key: the assumption concerns a designed but unspecified object.
Let the hash of the Fiat–Shamir transform be modelled as a programmable
random oracle. There is an efficient simulator that, given only
The statement is specified at delta level (ZIP 226). Its arithmetisation
exists only in the document outside the ZIPs named in
Remark 4.7, so the circuit and its verifying key
are designed but unspecified, and Assumptions 4.9
and 4.10 are the only hypotheses through which later results
depend on them. Condition A4′ is sound only if the circuit multiplies by
the witnessed AssetBase and nothing else. The Orchard
variable-base scalar multiplication was corrected at NU6.2 because it left
the base under-constrained (ZIP 257, “NU6.2 deployment”). ZIP 226, which
turns the value base into a witness (“Value Commitment Correctness”),
does not mention the correction, which any OrchardZSA circuit must carry.
ZIP 257 made the Orchard proof length
Consider the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Spend-authority
experiment” with R ActionZSA in place of
R Action : a key generated with
The proof is a reduction to the proof of the Ironwood Guide’s
Theorem “Spend authority”. By Assumption 4.9 the extractor
yields, for the accepted Split Action, a witness of
R ActionZSA with
An Action Group is a non-empty finite sequence of OrchardZSA Actions together with one anchor rt , the flags enableSpends , enableOutputs and enableZSA in { 0, 1 } , and one aggregate proof for the relation of Definition 4.6 at the primary inputs
| (rt, cv i net, nf i, rk i, cmx i, enableSpends, enableOutputs, enableZSA) |
of its Actions i . Each Action carries the public fields (cv net, nf, rk, cmx, epk, C enc, C out) of an Orchard Action description (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Action description”) and its own spend-authorisation signature under rk . The term is that of ZIP 228, “Terminology”: Actions that share the tuple
| (rt, enableSpends, enableOutputs, enableZSA, nAGExpiryHeight) . |
ZIP 227 requires
The structure is specified by ZIPs 226 to 228, all Draft. Its encoding exists only in ZIP 230, which is Withdrawn; the layout that ZIP 230 calls version 6 is not the version 6 of ZIP 229, which has no Action Groups (ZIP 229, “Transaction Format”). The byte lengths of the note ciphertext and of an Action depend on a plaintext encoding that no current ZIP defines (Definition 3.7). The flag enableZSA has no flag bit in any current format. ZIP 230 assigns it bit 2 of the Orchard flags byte, which ZIP 229, “Consensus Rules”, reserves as 0 in version 6 and which is enableCrossAddress in the Ironwood flags byte (Ironwood Guide, §“Bundle flags”; ZIP 258, “Consensus rules from NU6.3 activation”). The design conflicts with live text, so the flag bit is an open problem (Definition 1.2).