This section extends the Orchard note by one field, the Asset Base (§3.1); extends the note commitment by a case split whose native branch is the Orchard commitment (§3.2); states the derivations of the note’s randomness from its seed and what no live text fixes of them (§3.3); states the field set of the note plaintext (§3.4); and replaces the fixed value base of the net value commitment by the Asset Base (§3.5). It proves hiding and binding of both commitments within and across Assets. Every construction of the section is taken from ZIP 226, which is Draft; the Orchard objects it extends are those of the Ironwood Guide and are cited, not restated.
An OrchardZSA note is a tuple
| n = (d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, ψ, rcm) |
of type
| Note OrchardZSA := | { 0, 1 } 88 × (E (F p Pallas) ∖ { O }) × { 0, ..., 2 64 − 1 } | ||
| × E ∗ × F p Pallas × F p Pallas × F p Vesta, |
with
Let
| M (n) := g d ⋆ ‖ pk d ⋆ ‖ LE 64 (v) ‖ LE 255 (ρ) ‖ LE 255 (ψ) |
the 1086 -bit Orchard message of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Note commitment”. Let
| M ZSA (n) := M (n) ∥ AssetBase ⋆, |
where the 256 -bit star encoding AssetBase ⋆ has the bytes
asset _ base of Definition 2.14. The string
M ZSA (n) has the fixed length 1342 : 135 chunks of 10
bits with padding 8 , against 109 chunks for M (n) , within the chunk
bound
| H D | := GroupHash (z.cash:Orchard-NoteCommit-r, ε), | ||
| M ^ ZSA | := SinsemillaHashToPoint (z.cash:ZSA-NoteCommit-M, M ZSA (n)), |
the OrchardZSA note commitment
| cm := NoteCommit rcm (M (n)), |
with NoteCommit the Orchard commitment of the cited definition. In the
custom branch,
| cm := { M ^ ZSA + [rcm] H D if M ^ ZSA ≠ ⊥, ⊥ otherwise . |
In
both branches
In the native branch the Asset Base is not an input of the commitment.
Hence the OrchardZSA commitment of a note with
Hiding with one output distribution. Let rcm be uniform on F p Vesta and independent of the content. For every content (d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, ψ) whose hash point in its branch is not ⊥ , the commitment cm is uniform on E (F p Pallas) . Hence the distributions of cm and of cmx depend neither on the content nor on the branch, and commitments to ZEC and to Custom Assets are identically distributed.
Binding. Under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions
“Discrete logarithms on Pallas” and “GroupHash as a random oracle”,
no efficient algorithm outputs, except with negligible probability,
OrchardZSA notes
Under the same assumptions, no efficient algorithm outputs,
except with negligible probability, a custom-branch content with
Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified construction; conditional on no unspecified object. Part (a) is stated for uniform rcm and does not cover a derived trapdoor, whose derivation is classified in Remark 3.6.
Write
| Q O := Q (z.cash:Orchard-NoteCommit-M), Q Z := Q (z.cash:ZSA-NoteCommit-M) . |
The generators
Q O , Q Z ,
(a) In both branches
(b) Step 1. The map from a content to its branch and message is injective
except on a diversifier collision: the branch is fixed by whether
Step 2. Let
Both native. The Orchard components differ, since the Asset Bases agree, and the Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Hiding and binding of note commitments” (b) applies.
Both custom. The three steps of the Ironwood Guide’s Proposition
“Collision resistance of the Sinsemilla instances” hold for the message
length
Across branches. Let n be native and n ′ custom, with pieces m and m ′ of M (n) and M ZSA (n ′) . Unfolding both hash points gives
| [2 109] Q O ∓ [2 135] Q Z + ∑ j [χ j (m) ∓ χ j (m ′)] S (j) + [rcm ∓ rcm ′] H D = O . |
The coefficient 2 109 on Q O is non-zero modulo p Vesta .
In each case the relation is non-trivial among values of GroupHash at distinct inputs, which the Ironwood Guide’s Lemma “Relations among fixed generators” excludes except with negligible probability. The first particular case of (b) is the case across branches; the second is either that case or the case of two custom notes with distinct messages.
(c) Step (2) of the proof of the cited proposition applies to the domain
of Q Z : an operand O arises only if
Q Z or some S (j) is O , itself a non-trivial
relation, and an exceptional case at step i yields a relation with
coefficient α 2 i − 1 on Q Z , where
ZIP 226 argues the property in rationale only, attributing it to the Sinsemilla hash function (“by definition of the Sinsemilla hash function”, “Rationale for Note Commitment”; see also “Privacy Implications”). The unblinded hash is deterministic and hides nothing; the hiding comes from the term [rcm] H D . The plaintext equivalence of Orchard and native OrchardZSA notes, which is withdrawn ZIP 230 text, is not used.
Commitments are hidden only as group elements. ZIP 226, “Privacy Implications”, states that Orchard note commitments are distinguishable from OrchardZSA note commitments by context, since the two protocols are carried by different transaction versions (in its text, version 5 for Orchard and version 6 for OrchardZSA), whether or not both are active. No current format assigns OrchardZSA a version: version 6 is the format of ZIP 229, “Transaction Format”, which carries Orchard-pool and Ironwood-pool Actions and no ZSA. ZIP 248, “Potential Future Bundle Types”, lists OrchardZSA provisionally as variant 2 of bundle type 3 , the Orchard bundle type, whose public variant identifier would likewise separate the two. Within one OrchardZSA bundle, commitments to ZEC and to Custom Assets are identically distributed under a uniform trapdoor (Proposition 3.3(a)); the derived trapdoor, undefined in live text, is not covered (Remark 3.6). The carrier is treated in “The transaction carrier” (§8).
ZIP 226, “Abstract”, is defined relative to the protocol with ZIP 2005 applied, and reads H rcm , H ψ and the recoverable plaintexts as ZIP 2005 defines them; it calls ZIP 2005 “Orchard Quantum Recoverability”. ZIP 2005 is now “Ironwood Quantum Recoverability” (Proposed). It is active with NU6.3 and merged into the protocol specification (ZIP 258, “ZIP 2005 activation”; ZIP 2005, “Specification Updates”), and it applies its recoverable plaintext format, lead byte 0x03 , only to Ironwood-pool notes (ZIP 229, “Transaction Format”), while ZIP 226 places OrchardZSA notes in the Orchard pool (Remark 1.7). The two premises no longer coincide. Two constructions depend on them: the lead byte, here, and the seed of split nullifiers, at “Nullifiers of OrchardZSA notes” (§4.2). The derivations of ZIP 2005 are constructed in the Ironwood Guide, §“The note seed: Ironwood derivations (lead byte 0x03 )”, and are cited, not restated.
Let an OrchardZSA note be created with recipient (d, pk d) , value v ,
element
| ψ | := ToBase (PRFexpand rseed ([0x09] ∥ ρ ̄)), | ||
| rcm | := Derive _ rcm rseed (leadByte, g d ⋆, pk d ⋆, v, ρ ̄, ψ), |
where ψ does not depend on the lead byte, and Derive _ rcm is defined only for two lead bytes:
| Derive _ rcm rseed (leadByte, ...) := { ToScalar (PRFexpand rseed ([0x05] ∥ ρ ̄)) if leadByte = 0x02, the pre _ rcm derivation if leadByte = 0x03, |
the latter being that of the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Derivations under lead byte 0x03 ”. Neither input list contains AssetBase . ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment”, requires leadByte to be the placeholder { { ZSALEADBYTE } } whenever §“Sending Notes (Orchard)” or §“Dummy Notes (Orchard)” of the protocol specification is invoked, directly or indirectly, for an OrchardZSA note. That rule speaks of “the computation of ρ and ψ ”; under the amended specification the lead byte enters only Derive _ rcm . The specification admits lead byte 0x02 in the Orchard pool and 0x03 in the Ironwood pool only (protocol specification, §“Note Plaintexts and Memo Fields”), and ZIP 2005, “Usage with other proposals requiring note plaintext format changes”, requires such proposals to use a new lead byte value or values. Classes: the derivation of ψ is specified; the derivation of rcm and the value of the lead byte are classified in Remark 3.6.
Each part carries one class of Definition 1.2.
The derivation of ψ is specified.
The value of the lead byte is an open problem. The removed design’s 0x03 is the Ironwood lead byte in live text, a design that conflicts with live text; the placeholders { { ZSALEADBYTE } } (ZIP 226), { { LEADBYTE } } (withdrawn ZIP 230) and { { MBLEADBYTE } } (ZIP 231, “Note plaintext lead byte assignment”) are unassigned.
Until the byte is assigned, the rcm of an OrchardZSA note is undefined in live text, and the Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Hiding under the derived trapdoor” does not transfer. The OrchardZSA Action statement, like the Orchard one, does not check the derivation (Ironwood Guide, Remark “What the statement does not check” (ii)), so for the outputs of a transfer the gap binds only sender and recipient. Its consequence for validators is stated at “Issue Notes” (§6.1).
The OrchardZSA note plaintext of a created OrchardZSA note carries the fields (leadByte, d, v, rseed, memo) of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Note plaintext” and, in addition, the 32 -byte string asset _ base of Definition 2.14 (ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment”). The recipient needs asset _ base to recompute cmx by Definition 3.2 and to spend the note. Given an encoding of fixed length and an assigned lead byte, the Ironwood Guide’s Constructions “Encryption to the recipient” and “Trial decryption” apply unchanged. Its acceptance checks (§“Trial decryption and note acceptance”) apply with the lead-byte check and the derivation of rcm replaced by those of that lead byte (Remark 3.6), asset _ base required to decode to a point of E ∗ , and the recomputed commitment that of Definition 3.2. Classes: the field set is specified; the encoding is an open problem.
ZIP 226 delegates the encoding to ZIP 230, which is Withdrawn. Its layout
| leadByte ‖ d ‖ v ‖ rseed ‖ asset _ base ∥ K memo |
presupposes the memo key K memo of ZIP 231, which is now defined only for version- 7 transactions (ZIP 231, “Specification”), and a lead byte that live text assigns otherwise (Remark 3.6). No current ZIP defines an OrchardZSA plaintext encoding. The statement of withdrawn ZIP 230 that Orchard and native OrchardZSA notes need not be distinguished in plaintexts carries no weight; the commitment half of that statement follows from Definition 3.2.
Let an Action (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Action”) consume an
OrchardZSA note of value v old and create an OrchardZSA note of
value v new , both with Asset Base
| v net := v old − v new ∈ { − 2 64 + 1, ..., 2 64 − 1 } . |
For rcv drawn by the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Value-commitment trapdoor”, its per-Asset value commitment is
| cv net := ValueCommit rcv OrchardZSA (AssetBase, v net) := [v net mod p Vesta] AssetBase + [rcv] R Orchard, |
with R Orchard and the reading of v net modulo
p Vesta as in the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Net value
commitment”. For
Perfect hiding. For every
Binding across bases. Call a base admissible if it is
given as the value of GroupHash at the input
(z.cash:Orchard-cv, v) or at
(z.cash:OrchardZSA, D) for a byte string D . Under the
Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions “Discrete logarithms on Pallas” and
“GroupHash as a random oracle”, no efficient algorithm outputs, except
with negligible probability, two families ((B i, v i)) i and
((B j ′, v j ′)) j of polynomial size, of admissible bases with integers,
and trapdoors
| ∑ i [v i] B i + [rcv] R Orchard = ∑ j [v j ′] B j ′ + [rcv ′] R Orchard |
while the base-value vectors differ: for some group-hash input x , the
sum of the v i at bases with input x and the sum of the v j ′ at
bases with input x differ modulo p Vesta . For one pair each,
(B, v) and (B ′, v ′) with inputs x and x ′ , equal commitments
force
Binding fails for arbitrary bases. For
Status (Definition 1.3): proved here; conditional on no unspecified object.
(i) The proof of the Ironwood Guide’s Lemma “Hiding and binding of
net value commitments” (i) uses only
(ii) Let P x denote the value of GroupHash at input x , and c x the difference, modulo p Vesta , of the two sums of values at input x . Grouping both sides by input, a double opening gives
| ∑ x [c x] P x + [rcv − rcv ′] R Orchard = O |
with some
(iii) Direct computation: