This section constructs the objects of ZIP 227 that create value of a Custom Asset: the Issue Note and the rule by which validators compute its commitment (§6.1); the Issuance Action and the Issuance Bundle that carry Issue Notes (§6.2); the element ρ of an Issue Note, derived from the first nullifier of the Action Group (§6.3); the reference note (§6.4); and the rules and the digest hypothesis that bind an Issuance Bundle to its issuer and to one transaction (§6.5). Issuance is public. The one privacy property that it keeps, the unlinkability of a later spend of an Issue Note, is proved in §6.1. The rules that update the global issuance state are those of “The global issuance state” (§7). Every construction of the section is taken from ZIP 227, which is Draft, together with the objects of ZIP 226 that it uses.
An Issue Note represents the issuance of a value v of one Custom Asset to one recipient. It is a tuple
| (d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, rseed) |
of type
| Note Issue := | { 0, 1 } 88 × (E (F p Pallas) ∖ { O }) × { 0, ..., 2 64 − 1 } | ||
| × E ∗ × F p Pallas × B Y [32], |
with the following components.
The pair (d, pk d) is the recipient’s address, of the type of the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Diversified address”: the diversifier d and the diversified transmission key pk d , a point other than the identity (ZIP 227 types it in KA Orchard . Public , protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”).
The value v counts units of the Asset. The lengths 88 and 64 are the constants l d and l value of the protocol specification, §“Constants”.
The point
The note seed rseed is a 32 -byte string that the issuer MUST sample uniformly at random.
An Issue Note carries no ψ and no rcm ; both are to be derived from rseed (Remark 6.2). ZIP 227 writes the fourth and fifth factors of the type as P ∗ and F q P (Table 1; ZIP 227, “Issue Note”). Class: specified.
Commitments of Issue Notes. No note commitment of an Issue Note is transmitted. Every validator MUST compute the commitment cm of each Issue Note by NoteCommit OrchardZSA (Definition 3.2), exactly as for an OrchardZSA note with the same fields, and, when the transaction is included in the block chain, append its extracted form cmx to the note commitment tree after the commitments of the Action Group’s Actions. The order is Definition 7.4, in “State transition of a transaction” (§7.2), and the tree is the one that Remark 1.7 leaves open (ZIP 227, “Issue Note”, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes” and “Addition to the Note Commitment Tree”). Class: specified; its evaluability is qualified by Remark 6.2.
The OrchardZSA note of an Issue Note
(d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, rseed) is
(d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, ψ, rcm) , with ψ and rcm
derived from rseed as in Definition 3.5. With
| ψ | := ToBase (PRFexpand rseed ([0x09] ∥ ρ ̄)), | ||
| rcm | := Derive _ rcm rseed (leadByte, g d ⋆, pk d ⋆, v, ρ ̄, ψ) . |
The derivation of ψ does not depend on the lead byte and is specified. The derivation of rcm is designed but unspecified, and the value of its lead byte is an open problem (Remark 3.6). An Issue Note has no plaintext that could carry a lead byte. Three consequences follow.
Until the value is assigned, the commitment that every validator MUST compute is not computable from live text. The gap is at consensus level. For the created note of a transfer the same gap binds only sender and recipient, since consensus sees only cmx .
The recipient needs the same rcm to open the commitment when it spends the note, in condition A1′ of Definition 4.6.
The Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Hiding under the derived trapdoor” does not transfer to Issue Notes. Hiding plays no role for them: every field, rseed included, is public (Remark 6.6).
(ZIP 227, “Issue Note” and “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”; ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment”; ZIP 2005, “Changes to the Protocol Specification”, amending the protocol specification’s §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”.)
The commitment NoteCommit OrchardZSA may return ⊥ . For a note created by an Action, the sender repeats the derivation with a new rseed when the extracted commitment is ⊥ (protocol specification, §“Sending Notes (Orchard)”). ZIP 227 states no rule for an Issue Note whose commitment is ⊥ , and no text proposes one: the consequence for the transaction is an open problem. An Issue Note is in the custom branch of Definition 3.2, its Asset Base being a derived one (Proposition 2.13), where the commitment is ⊥ only if the hash point is; for uniform rseed the event therefore has negligible probability, by Proposition 3.3(c) (ZIP 227, “Issue Note” and “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”).
Let a key be generated with
The ideal answers are independent of the published notes when
The proof is that of the Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Nullifier unlinkability”. Its game already lets the adversary choose every field of every submitted note, so publishing an Issue Note in full, rseed included, gives the adversary nothing that it does not hold. Its hybrids use a submitted note only through the triple (ρ i, ψ i, cm i) , with cm i a point other than ⊥ and the ρ i pairwise distinct: the hops H 1 to H 3 change the key material only, the hop H 4 uses the distinctness of the ρ i for the lazily sampled random function, and the hop H 5 and the final statement use cm i only as a point to which [s i] K Orchard or [u i] K Orchard is added. The nullifier of an OrchardZSA note is DeriveNullifier of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Nullifier” with the OrchardZSA commitment in place of the Orchard one (ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment”; §4.2). Every hybrid and every bound therefore carries over verbatim. The hypothesis that the ρ i are pairwise distinct is supplied, for the Issue Notes of a valid chain, by Proposition 6.9, except with negligible probability.
For the reference note,
ZIP 227 specifies issuance through three components: the Issuance Bundle of a transaction, in which a publicly named issuer creates Issue Notes; the flag finalize of each Issuance Action, which, once set, ends issuance of its Asset permanently; and the global issuance state kept by every node, constructed in “The global issuance state” (§7).
Let
| IssueNoteFields := { 0, 1 } 88 × (E (F p Pallas) ∖ { O }) × { 0, ..., 2 64 − 1 } × F p Pallas × B Y [32], |
the fields (d, pk d, v, ρ, rseed) of an Issue Note without its Asset Base.
An Issuance Action is a triple
| (assetDescHash, vNotes, flagsIssuance), |
where the hash
An Issuance Bundle is a triple
| (issuer, vIssueActions, issueAuthSig), |
where
The pair (issuer, assetDescHash) is an Asset Identifier and determines AssetBase by Construction 2.10. With it, each element (d, pk d, v, ρ, rseed) of vNotes determines the Issue Note (d, pk d, v, AssetBase, ρ, rseed) of Definition 6.1 completely. The commitment is omitted, because every validator recomputes it (ZIP 227, “Issuance Action”, “Issuance Bundle”, “Issue Note” and “Issuance Protocol”). Class: specified.
Encoding status. The byte encoding of the Issuance Bundle and of the Issuance Action exists only in withdrawn ZIP 230 and is designed but unspecified; it is not the version- 6 format of ZIP 229 (Remark 8.1; ZIP 227, “Issuance Action” and “Issuance Bundle”).
Issuance Actions without notes. The rules of ZIP 227 place no requirement on the number of Issue Notes of an Issuance Action. Withdrawn ZIP 230 admits an Issuance Action with none, so that an issuer can finalise an issued Asset without issuing more of it. The validity of such an action for an Asset without an entry in the issuance state is the open case of Remark 7.5, in “State transition of a transaction” (§7.2) (ZIP 227, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”; ZIP 230, “Issuance Action Description”).
ZIP 227 enables only public issuance, so that the supply of each Asset can be tracked (ZIP 227, “Motivation”; “Requirements”: the issuance mechanism should enable public tracking of the supply). The Issue Notes are unencrypted. The issuer, the Asset (through assetDescHash , from which anyone recomputes AssetBase ), every value, every recipient address, every ρ and rseed , and every flag finalize are public, so issuance publicly links each recipient address to an Asset and an amount. Since rseed is public, so is ψ , and so, once the lead byte is assigned, are the commitment and the leaf of each Issue Note. With the public burn set (Definition 5.1), the amount of each Asset in circulation, issued less burnt, is a public function of the chain, which ZIP 227 records as the balance of the global issuance state (“Global Issuance State”). The later use of an Issue Note remains private, to the extent of Proposition 6.4. In this volume issuance is called public and Issue Notes unencrypted (ZIP 227, “Issuance Action”).
An Issue Note is created outside any Action, so the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Chaining rule” (§“Nullifier chaining”) gives it no ρ .
Define
| DeriveIssuedRho : F p Pallas × { 0, ..., 2 32 − 1 } × { 0, ..., 2 32 − 1 } → F p Pallas |
by
| DeriveIssuedRho (nf, i A, i N) | ||
| := ToBase (PRFexpand I2LEOSP 256 (nf) ([0x84] ‖ I2LEOSP 32 (i A) ‖ I2LEOSP 32 (i N))), |
with PRFexpand the Ironwood Guide’s Construction
“Expansion function” and ToBase its Definition “Field
reductions”. The expansion input after the key has
| ρ := DeriveIssuedRho (nf 0, 0, i A, i N), |
where nf 0, 0 is the nullifier published by the first Action of the transaction’s Action Group (Definition 4.13), whatever the kind of its consumed note. The definition presupposes an Action Group, which rule (I1) of Definition 6.12 enforces. The derivation adds one row to the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Domain bytes of PRF expansion”:
| b | Key κ | Remainder t ′ | f | Output | Section |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0x84 | I2LEOSP 256 (nf 0, 0) | I2LEOSP 32 (i A) ∥ I2LEOSP 32 (i N) | ToBase | ρ | §6.3 |
The key is a public nullifier. No other ZIP and no section of the protocol specification uses the byte 0x84 , and no registry of a lower volume lists it. Because the key is public, neither the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “Pseudorandomness of PRF expansion” nor its Lemma “Independence of domain-separated expansions” applies (ZIP 227, “Computation of ρ ”; protocol specification, §“Pseudo Random Functions” and §“Orchard Key Components”). Class: specified.
For each fixed 16 -byte personalisation P , the function
The expansion inputs, key and remainder, of the Issue Notes of a valid chain are pairwise distinct, and each differs from the input of every other row of PRFexpand .
Under Assumption 6.8, consider an execution in which at most q queries in total are made to the oracle of personalisation Zcash_ExpandSeed. The probability that two Issue Notes of the chain have equal ρ , or that the ρ of an Issue Note equals one of M elements ρ of notes created by Actions and fixed before the query that yields it, is at most
| (q (q − 1) 2 + q M) (1 p Pallas + 2 − 512) ≤ (q + M) 2 p Pallas . |
With no query beyond the N issued values,
Literal uniqueness is not claimed, nor distinctness from the ρ of notes created by later Actions, which the derivation does not control. Distinct OrchardZSA notes have distinct commitments by Proposition 3.3(b). The proof of the Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Nullifier uniqueness” then applies with the hash base and message of each note’s branch of Definition 3.2, which unfold as in the proof of Proposition 4.5(i). So distinct notes have distinct nullifiers whatever their ρ , and a collision can affect only notes equal in every field. The proposition extends to Issue Notes part (a) of the Ironwood Guide’s Corollary “Faerie Gold resistance”, which covers only notes created by Actions. Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified derivation; conditional on Assumption 6.8.
(a) Within a transaction the key is one and the index pairs (i A, i N) differ. Across transactions of a valid chain the keys I2LEOSP 256 (nf 0, 0) differ: nf 0, 0 is a published nullifier, and the nullifier-set rule forbids a nullifier to repeat within a pool (Ironwood Guide, §“Nullifier sets”; the pool is that of Remark 1.7), and I2LEOSP 256 is injective on F p Pallas . The oracle input is the 32 -byte key followed by the remainder. Every key of PRFexpand is a 32 -byte string (Ironwood Guide, Construction “Expansion function”), so the byte after the key is the lead byte, and 0x84 differs from the lead byte of every other row.
(b) By (a) each issued ρ is ToBase of the oracle value at
an input of its own. In the lazy form of the Crypto Guide’s
Definition “Random oracle”, the first query at an input returns a fresh
uniform 512 -bit string, independent of all earlier values. The map
ToBase takes each value of F p Pallas on at most
⌈ 2 512 / p Pallas ⌉ strings, so the fresh output equals a
value fixed before the query with probability at most
The first Issue Note of the Issuance Action in which a Custom Asset is
issued for the first time MUST be a reference note: an Issue Note
with
| ( | 204, 54, 96, 25, 89, 33, 59, 107, 12, 219, 150, 167, 92, 23, 195, 166, | ||
| 104, 169, 127, 13, 106, 140, 92, 225, 100, 165, 24, 234, 155, 169, 165, | |||
| 14, 167, 81, 145, 253, 134, 27, 15, 241, 14, 98, 176) . |
Recomputing the address and every acceptance check from the cited constructions reproduces this array. Validators enforce the rule and store the reference note as note ref in the global issuance state, by rule (I5) of Construction 7.3, in “State transition of a transaction” (§7.2) (ZIP 227, “Reference Notes” and “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”). Class: specified; the reference note is mandated and stored in consensus state, and no section of ZIP 227 states its purpose.
Let n ref be the reference note of a Custom Asset with Asset Base B , its extracted commitment a leaf of the note commitment tree.
Any party can construct a Split Action (Definition 4.2) whose Split Input copies n ref , with a witness of Definition 4.6 and a spend-authorisation signature that verifies under its rk , for a created note of Asset Base B and value 0 to any receiver of its choice. Proposition 4.12 therefore imposes nothing on n ref , whose recipient key is public by construction.
Let an efficient adversary output OrchardZSA bundles of valid
blocks whose Action proofs and binding signatures verify and whose witnessed
and burn-pair Asset Bases meet the premise on the bases of
§5.3. Except with negligible probability, in every
such bundle in which no extracted witness of Asset Base B has
Hence n ref serves exactly the created notes of B that a party holding no note of B can produce. Under Remark 1.7, a copy to a receiver other than that of the copied note would violate the cross-address rule if the notes were in the Orchard pool. Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified constructions; part (a) is conditional on the open lead byte (Remark 6.2); part (b) is conditional on Assumption 4.9 through Proposition 5.6, and its premise on the bases is discharged for valid chains in “Security” (§9). The reading of the purpose is the volume’s; ZIP 227 states none.
(a) The construction is explicit. The all-zero spending key is accepted
(Definition 6.10), so its ask , nk , r ivk
and ak P are public constants. The note n ref is
published unencrypted with ρ and rseed
(Remark 6.6), so ψ is public and, once the lead
byte is assigned (Remark 6.2), so are rcm and the
commitment. The position of its leaf in the tree is public, by
Definition 7.4. The party takes a valid anchor
rt whose tree contains the leaf and computes its authentication
path, which satisfies A3′; it opens A1′ with the fields of
n ref and
(b) By Proposition 5.6(a), except with negligible
probability, the net values of the Actions of base B , read from the
extracted witnesses, sum as integers to the burnt amount v B , which is
0 if B is not burnt. Every such Action has
For a transaction that contains an Issuance Bundle (issuer, vIssueActions, issueAuthSig) :
It MUST contain an OrchardZSA Action Group; by Definition 4.13 it contains exactly one.
The encoding ik _ encoding of the issuance validating key ik MUST be taken from the field issuer and MUST start with the byte 0x00 , which indicates a BIP-340 public key; ik is the remaining 32 bytes (Definition 2.4).
The first byte of issueAuthSig MUST be 0x00 , and
| IssueAuthSig . Validate (ik, SigHash, σ) = 1 |
MUST hold for the 64 -byte σ that follows it (Definition 2.2). ZIP 227 writes the rule with issueAuthSig in place of σ ; the scheme byte is stripped because Validate is typed over 32 -byte keys and 64 -byte signatures.
For every Issuance Action the Issue Notes are then constructed from the elements of its vNotes , with AssetBase derived from its assetDescHash and from issuer (Remark 6.14). The rules on the issuance state, (T1) to (T4) and (I4) to (I7), are Construction 7.3. The message SigHash is the transaction’s signature digest (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Signature digest”), which ZIP 227 defines by the protocol specification’s §“SIGHASH Transaction Hashing” “with the modifications described in ZIP 226”, under SIGHASH _ ALL . The cited section of ZIP 226 does not exist; ZIP 226, “Sighash modifications relative to ZIP 244”, defers to ZIP 246, which is Withdrawn; and the version- 6 digest of ZIP 229 has no issuance child (ZIP 227, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes” and “Issuance Authorization Signing and Validation”). Class: rules (I1) to (I3) specified; the signed message designed but unspecified (Remark 8.3).
The signature digest SigHash of an OrchardZSA transaction is computed without any signature of the transaction: neither issueAuthSig , nor a spend-authorisation signature, nor the binding signature is an input. No efficient algorithm outputs, except with negligible probability, two transactions with equal SigHash that differ in
the effecting data of the Issuance Bundle: issuer , the number and order of the Issuance Actions, and, per Issuance Action, assetDescHash , finalize and every field (d, pk d, v, ρ, rseed) of every Issue Note;
the burn set; or
the published data of the Actions of the Action Group, in particular nf 0, 0 .
This hypothesis (H-SIG) concerns a designed but unspecified object. “Transaction digests and the signature message” (§8.2) shows that the digest of withdrawn ZIP 246 meets it under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “Collision resistance of BLAKE2b”, and states it as the obligation on any future digest (Remark 8.2). The version- 6 digest of ZIP 229 does not meet (i).
Of the identity chain of Construction 2.10, consensus sees exactly two links on the issuance side: issuer in the Issuance Bundle and assetDescHash in each Issuance Action. The Asset Identifier, the Asset Digest and the Asset Base of issued notes are never transmitted. Every validator derives
| AssetBase := ZSAValueBase ( | BLAKE2b - 512 (ZSA-Asset-Digest, | ||
| EncodeAssetId (issuer, assetDescHash))) |
by that construction. The same bytes issuer name the Asset and yield, by (I2), the key under which (I3) verifies the signature; under Assumption 6.13(i), both issuer and assetDescHash are in the signed message. The consequence for authority over issuance is Theorem 9.8, in “Authority over issuance” (§9.4) (ZIP 227, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes” and “Issuance Bundle”).
Every ρ of an Issue Note is a function of nf 0, 0 (Construction 6.7), fixed once the first Action of the Action Group is fixed. Under Assumption 6.13 the signed digest covers every ρ and every other effecting field of the transaction. The issuer can therefore sign only after the nullifier of the first Action and all effecting data are fixed. Its message is the SIGHASH _ ALL digest that every spend-authorisation signature and the binding signature sign (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Signature digest”; ZIP 227, “Computation of ρ ”, “Issuance Protocol” and “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”).
Let ik be the issuance validating key of an honest issuer, which signs only digests SigHash of transactions it builds. Except with negligible probability, in a valid chain produced by an efficient adversary that obtains the honest issuer’s signatures:
every Issuance Bundle whose issuer is ik _ encoding of ik belongs to a transaction whose SigHash the issuer signed;
no transaction of the chain that contains an Issuance Bundle has the SigHash of another transaction of the chain.
Hence each digest that the issuer signs authorises the issuance of at most one transaction of the chain. Rule (I1) is what makes (b) hold: without an Action Group, the digest of a transaction that carries only an Issuance Bundle depends on no value that the chain forbids to repeat, and a duplicate of the bundle in a transaction with the same remaining digest inputs has the same SigHash , so its signature verifies again (ZIP 227, “Rationale”). Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified rules (I1) to (I3); conditional on Assumption 6.13, a hypothesis on the designed but unspecified signed message, and on Assumption 2.3. ZIP 227, “Rationale”, states the replay argument informally.
(a) An accepted bundle satisfies (I2) and (I3), so its signature verifies
on the transaction’s SigHash under the key whose encoding is
issuer , which is ik by the injectivity of
(b) By (I1) a transaction with an Issuance Bundle has an Action Group, and so a nullifier nf 0, 0 . Another transaction of the chain with equal SigHash has, by Assumption 6.13(iii), the same published Action data, except with negligible probability, since the chain is the output of an efficient algorithm; in particular it publishes nf 0, 0 as well. The nullifier-set rule forbids a nullifier to repeat across the transactions of a valid chain (Ironwood Guide, §“Nullifier sets”), so no such transaction exists. By (a) and (b) the map from the transactions of the chain that carry a bundle under ik to the digests that the issuer signed is injective, which is the final claim. □