This section constructs the key components of the protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, from the instances of §2: the spending key and the spend-side secrets, the viewing keys, and the diversified addresses. It states each assumption that their security needs at its first use and proves, in Proposition 3.18, four one-way separations between key tiers.
Every derivation of this section is that of a key generated with
The spending key sk is a uniformly random 256 -bit string,
identified with a 32 -byte string (protocol specification,
§“Constants”). Key generation draws sk , derives from it the
components of this section, and discards sk and draws a new one
when
For a spending key sk , the spend authorising key ask , the nullifier deriving key nk and the trapdoor r ivk of Commit ivk are
| ask | := ToScalar (PRFexpand sk ([0x06])) ∈ F p Vesta, | ||
| nk | := ToBase (PRFexpand sk ([0x07])) ∈ F p Pallas, | ||
| r ivk | := ToScalar (PRFexpand sk ([0x08])) ∈ F p Vesta |
(protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”). The three lead
bytes are rows of Table 4. Key generation discards
sk if
The scalars ask and r ivk lie in F p Vesta , the scalar field of the Pallas group, because each multiplies a Pallas point: ask the generator G SpendAuth below, r ivk the blinding base of Commit ivk (§3.2). The key nk is an element of the base field F p Pallas .
The three inputs of PRFexpand sk have distinct lead bytes. By Lemma 2.15, under Assumption 2.12, the triple (ask, nk, r ivk) computed from a uniform sk , before rejection and before the normalisation below, is therefore computationally indistinguishable from independent uniform elements of F p Vesta , F p Pallas and F p Vesta , up to an additional statistical distance of three reduction distances, each below 2 − 257 (§2.3).
Let
compute the point
if its y -coordinate is odd, that is, if bit 255 of the star encoding P ⋆ is 1 , replace ask by − ask ;
let
The spend validating key is the point ak P together with its x -coordinate ak , a field element (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”).
After step 2 the point ak P has even y -coordinate. The point
P is not O , since
For an accepted key,
The full viewing key of an accepted key is the triple
| fvk := (ak, nk, r ivk) ∈ { 1, ..., p Pallas − 1 } × F p Pallas × F p Vesta, |
with ak the field element of §3.1; the point ak P is recomputed from ak by the even- y lift.
With the key commitment of §2.4 and
| ivk := Commit r ivk ivk (ak, nk) = ShortCommit r ivk (D, LE 255 (ak) ∥ LE 255 (nk)) ∈ F p Pallas ∪ { ⊥ } . |
Explicitly, let M ^ be the Sinsemilla hash point of the 510 -bit message LE 255 (ak) ∥ LE 255 (nk) under the domain z.cash:Orchard-CommitIvk-M, and let
| H D := GroupHash (z.cash:Orchard-CommitIvk-r, ε) |
be the blinding base; then
Let
Let r ivk be uniform on F p Vesta and independent of
(ak, nk) , and let
By Lemma 2.26(i) the point
In particular ivk is not uniform on F p Vesta (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, note).
The further rejection condition of key generation concerns the internal key
of ZIP 32, §“Orchard internal key derivation”. That key has the same
ak and nk and a trapdoor
Under Assumptions 2.22 and 2.8, a single draw of key generation from independent uniform (ask, nk, r ivk) is rejected with negligible probability. Under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8, the output of key generation is within negligible statistical distance of a single draw from a uniform sk without rejection.
A single draw is rejected only if
The proofs of this section analyse a single draw and add the statistical distance bounded by this lemma, under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8.
Let
| R := PRFexpand K ([0x82] ‖ I2LEOSP 256 (ak) ‖ I2LEOSP 256 (nk)), |
a 64 -byte string, where I2LEOSP 256 encodes the field elements ak and nk as 32 -byte little-endian integers. The diversifier key dk is the first 32 bytes of R and the outgoing viewing key ovk the last 32 bytes (protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”; row 0x82 of Table 4). One output of PRFexpand , keyed by the encoding of r ivk , yields both.
The incoming viewing key is the pair (dk, ivk) ; the outgoing viewing key is ovk . The diversifier key dk derives diversifiers (§3.3). What the holders of ivk and of ovk can compute from note ciphertexts is stated in “Trial decryption and note acceptance” (§10.4) and “The outgoing ciphertext” (§10.3).
Equal extracted values come from commitment points C , C ′
with
Hence ivk is bound to the pair (ak, nk) , and so is every
address of the key (§3.3): its transmission key
For r ivk uniform and independent of every other quantity, ivk is independent of (ak, nk) by Lemma “Distribution of ivk ”. The derivation of (dk, ovk) is keyed by the same r ivk , so once dk or ovk is known that argument no longer applies, and modelling PRFexpand only as a PRF does not restore it: the key of row 0x82 is also the trapdoor of Commit ivk , outside the hypothesis of Lemma 2.15 (§2.3; protocol specification, §“Orchard Key Components”, note on the use of r ivk as both trapdoor and key). The volume states the joint assumption on Pallas scalar multiplication and PRFexpand that the specification proposes as Assumption 3.13.
For keys with
| (Commit r ivk ′ ivk (ak, nk), u 1, u 2), |
where r ivk ′ is uniform on F p Vesta and u 1 , u 2 are uniform 32 -byte strings, all independent. It is a precise form of the joint assumption that the protocol specification proposes (§“Orchard Key Components”, note); it is not perfect hiding. Results apply it after Lemma 2.15 (Assumption 2.12) has made r ivk uniform and independent of (ask, nk) , averaging over the key-generation distribution of (ak, nk) . It is used by Propositions 3.18, 3.17, 6.10 and 10.6, by Proposition “Confidentiality of the outgoing ciphertext” (§10.3) and by Theorem 12.13.
For an index
the diversifier is
the diversified base is
| T := GroupHash (z.cash:Orchard-gd, LEBS2OSP 88 (d)) |
and
| DiversifyHash (d) := { T if T ≠ O, GroupHash (z.cash:Orchard-gd, ε) otherwise ; |
the diversified transmission key is
The address is
The map LEBS2OSP 88 packs d into 11 bytes, eight bits at a
time, least significant bit first (§2.1). Every index
yields an address. The map GroupHash returns a point for every input, and
DiversifyHash replaces the identity by the fixed fallback point,
which is not the identity: the protocol specification types
DiversifyHash Orchard into the non-identity points.
The fallback case has negligible probability under
Assumption 2.8. Hence
For a uniform 256 -bit key, FF1 - AES256 with the empty tweak on { 0, 1 } 88 is a pseudorandom permutation: no efficient adversary with oracle access distinguishes it from a uniformly random permutation of { 0, 1 } 88 (Crypto Guide, §“Pseudorandom functions and permutations”, Definition “Pseudorandom permutation”, and §“Format-preserving encryption and FF1”, Definition “Format-preserving encryption”). It is the security requirement of the protocol specification, §“Pseudo Random Permutations”, whose note records that the distinguishing attack of Dunkelman, Kumar, Lambooij and Sanadhya at this domain size and round count is no better than exhaustive search for the 256 -bit key. It is used so that a diversifier reveals neither its index nor the key that produced it, in Proposition 3.17 (“Unlinkability of diversified addresses”).
Let P be a generator of E (F p Pallas) , let b and c be uniform on F p Vesta and a uniform on X Pallas (§3.2), all independent. The triples ([a] P, [b] P, [a b] P) and ([a] P, [b] P, [c] P) are computationally indistinguishable. With a uniform on F p Vesta instead, this is the DDH assumption of the Crypto Guide (§“Diffie–Hellman: computational and decisional”, Definition “Decisional Diffie–Hellman, DDH”). The volume assumes the form with a uniform on X Pallas because ivk is so distributed, and claims no reduction between the two forms; the protocol specification expects the non-uniformity of ivk to cause no security issue (§“Orchard Key Components”, note). It is used by Propositions 3.17 and 10.6 (“Confidentiality and key privacy of note encryption”).
Let two keys be generated independently with
For each β the game is modified by a sequence of hops, each changing the adversary’s output distribution by a negligible amount (Crypto Guide, §“The hybrid argument”, Lemma “Hybrid lemma”). Each hop is justified by a reduction that runs the game; the event E is efficiently decidable from the diversifiers and has probability at least 1 / 2 in every game below, so conditioning on E at most doubles each cost.
Each key is replaced by a single draw without rejection (Lemma “Rejection in key generation”, §3.2).
For each key in turn, (ask, nk, r ivk) is replaced by independent uniform elements of the three fields (Lemma 2.15); the reduction derives the remaining components and the addresses.
For each key in turn, (ivk, dk, ovk) is replaced by
| (Commit r ivk ′ ivk (ak, nk), u 1, u 2) |
(Assumption 3.13); the reduction is given
(ak, nk) , generates the other key itself, and computes the game
from the triple. Now dk and ovk are uniform and independent of all
else, and, except on the negligible events
For
On E the inputs LEBS2OSP 88 (d) of GroupHash are distinct, since LEBS2OSP 88 is injective, so under Assumption 2.8 the bases g 0 , g 1 , g ′ are independent uniform points, each O , which invokes the fallback, with probability 1 / p Vesta only.
In the last game the adversary’s view consists of ak , nk ,
ovk of both keys and (d 0, d 1, d ′) , independent of the rest and
identically distributed for
| (g 0, [ivk 0] g 0), (g 1, [ivk 1] g 1), (g ′, [ivk β] g ′), |
where ivk 0 , ivk 1 are independent and uniform on X Pallas . The
first two pairs are public keys of the per-key-base ElGamal scheme with
private keys ivk 0 and ivk 1 . For
Figure 1 gives the derivation graph, each edge labelled by its operation, and each one-way edge also by the assumption that makes it one-way. Proposition 3.18 proves four separations: the full viewing key yields no ask , the incoming viewing key neither nk nor ask , the outgoing viewing key no ivk , and an address no ivk .
Let a key be generated honestly with
given the full viewing key (ak, nk, r ivk) , the scalar ask ;
given the incoming viewing key (dk, ivk) , the key nk or the scalar ask ;
given ovk , the scalar ivk ;
given an address (d, pk d) of the key, the scalar ivk .
The hypotheses are: for (a), Assumptions 2.12 (through Lemma 2.15) and 2.22; for (b), those of (a) and, for nk , Assumption 3.13; for (c), Assumptions 2.12 and 3.13; for (d), Assumptions 2.12, 3.13, 2.8 and 2.22 (“Discrete logarithms on Pallas”). Every part also uses Lemma “Rejection in key generation” (§3.2), under Assumptions 2.12, 2.22 and 2.8. These are the only separations claimed.
By Lemma “Rejection in key generation” (§3.2), a single draw from a uniform sk replaces the key at a negligible cost. By Lemma 2.15, its triple (ask, nk, r ivk) is then replaced by independent uniform elements of F p Vesta , F p Pallas and F p Vesta , at a further negligible cost: in each part the success of an algorithm is efficiently decidable from the three values, by deriving the remaining components, running the algorithm and comparing its output with the secret. The result is called the idealised key.
(a) Let an algorithm A output ask from (ak, nk, r ivk)
with probability ε for the idealised key. An algorithm B
receives
(b) An algorithm that computes ask from (dk, ivk) computes it from
(ak, nk, r ivk) by first deriving (dk, ivk) , so (a) applies.
Let A output nk from (dk, ivk) with probability ε . A
distinguisher for Assumption 3.13, given
(ak, nk) of the idealised key and a triple (x, y, z) , runs A
on (y, x) and outputs 1 exactly when A outputs nk . On the
real triple it outputs 1 with probability ε . On the ideal triple
A receives u 1 and Commit r ivk ′ ivk (ak, nk) , which is
independent of nk unless
(c) Let A output ivk from ovk with probability ε . The
distinguisher given (ak, nk) and (x, y, z) runs A on z
and outputs 1 exactly when A outputs x . On the ideal triple,
(d) Let A output ivk from the address at an index j , possibly of
its choice, with probability ε . The distinguisher given
(ak, nk) and (x, y, z) computes
| p Vesta − 1 2 p Vesta (ε ′ − 2 p Vesta), |
a loss factor of
Of the objects of this section only an address (d, pk d) , with the base g d computed from d , is public; sk , ask , ak P , ak , nk , r ivk , the full viewing key, dk , ivk , ovk and the index j are secret key material. One incoming viewing key yields 2 88 addresses (§3.3), unlinkable in the sense of Proposition 3.17 (“Unlinkability of diversified addresses”).
What a holder of each key can compute from the objects of later sections is stated where those objects are constructed, each with a back-reference to Proposition 3.18: from nullifiers in “Nullifier uniqueness and unlinkability” (§6.4), and from note ciphertexts in “The outgoing ciphertext” (§10.3) and “Trial decryption and note acceptance” (§10.4). This section states no such power.