This section defines the burn set and the OrchardZSA bundle that it completes (§5.1); constructs the binding validating key, which subtracts the burnt amounts Asset by Asset (§5.2); and proves that a verifying binding signature forces per-Asset balance whenever every witnessed Asset Base and every Asset Base of a burn pair is a group-hash output at a suitably distinct input (§5.3). The premise on the bases concerns a single bundle; it is discharged for valid chains in “Security” (§9). The constructions are taken from ZIP 226 and ZIP 227, both Draft. The Orchard binding signature that they extend is that of the Ironwood Guide, §“The binding signature”, and is cited, not restated.
Burn destroys a stated amount of a Custom Asset
(Definition 1.5): it sends nothing to any address, lowers the
amount of the Asset in circulation, and publishes the Asset Base and the
amount, so that the destruction is publicly verifiable. A burn set
is a finite set of pairs with
bounds the amount of one Custom Asset burnt in one transaction, so that every burnt amount is representable in a signed -bit balance field. A burn set is valid when it satisfies the following rules.
For every pair,
For every pair,
Every Asset Base occurs in at most one pair. The burnt
amount of a point is therefore well defined: the of the
pair with
Rules (B1) to (B3) constrain the pairs only. Rule (B1) excludes the one point and no other, and no rule requires to be the Asset Base of an issued Asset. The state rule that a burn cannot exceed the amount of the Asset in circulation is ZIP 227’s; it is rule (T4) of Construction 7.3, in “State transition of a transaction” (§7.2) (ZIP 226, “Burn Mechanism”, “Additional Consensus Rules for the assetBurn set” and “Rationale for MAX_BURN_VALUE”; ZIP 227, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”). Class: specified; the carrier of the burn set is stated in “Transaction formats” (§8.1).
The OrchardZSA bundle of a transaction consists of at most one Action Group (Definition 4.13), one burn set satisfying (B1) to (B3), one balancing value and one binding signature. It extends the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Bundle” by the burn set; its anchor, flags and proof are those of the Action Group. ZIP 226 places one burn set in the transaction, and ZIP 227 limits the transaction to at most one Action Group, so the two readings coincide (ZIP 226, “Burn Mechanism”; ZIP 227, “Specification: Consensus Rule Changes”). Class: the structure is specified; its encoding, one burn set per Action Group in withdrawn ZIP 230, belongs to the carrier and is classified in Remark 8.1.
ZIPs 226 and 227 leave the transparent protocol unchanged and single-asset. Transparent inputs and outputs, and the Ironwood Guide’s transparent transaction value pool (Definition “Transparent transaction value pool”), carry the Native Asset only; Custom Assets have no transparent value pool and cannot be unshielded by a transfer. ZIP 226 conditions this on future consensus changes, which no ZIP specifies (ZIP 226, “Burn Mechanism”, note; “Rationale for Value Balance Verification”: “All Custom Assets are contained within the shielded pool, and cannot be unshielded via a regular transfer”). Structurally, the binding validating key of the next subsection (Definition 5.4) has, besides the Actions’ net value commitments, only the balancing value at and one burn term per pair; a non-zero net amount of a Custom Asset in a bundle can therefore be absorbed only by a burn pair of that Asset. The computational statement is Proposition 5.6. Class: specified.
Let an OrchardZSA bundle have Actions with net value commitments
(Ironwood Guide, Definition “Binding signing key”). The verifier computes, from public fields only, the binding validating key
where the subtracted points are the zero-trapdoor commitments
each signed integer entering as its residue modulo . Against the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Binding validating key” two things are new: the bases of the Actions’ commitments vary, being the witnessed Asset Bases, and one burn term is subtracted per pair.
The balancing value keeps the meaning of the Ironwood Guide’s
Definitions “Transparent transaction value pool” and “Balancing value”:
the net flow of ZEC between the pool and the transparent transaction value
pool, a signed integer in
The binding signature is that of the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “Binding signature”, the binding-signature instance of RedPallas on the base (Ironwood Guide, §“The RedPallas signature scheme”): the author signs with , and the verifier MUST validate the signature on under . Here is the signature digest of the transaction (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Signature digest”) as modified for OrchardZSA; the modifications and their class are stated in “Transaction digests and the signature message” (§8.2, Remark 8.3) (ZIP 226, “Value Balance Verification” and “Value Commitment”; protocol specification, §“Balance and Binding Signature (Orchard)”). Class: specified; the signed message is not.
For an honestly constructed bundle each equals
by condition A4′ of Definition 4.6. By the additive
homomorphism (Crypto Guide, §“The Pedersen commitment”, Theorem
“Additive homomorphism”), the trapdoor terms sum to , and the value terms group by Asset Base. When the
net values of each Custom Asset sum to its burnt amount and those of ZEC to
, every value term cancels, so
(ZIP 226, “Rationale for Value Balance Verification”). For a Split Action
The key is computed from the Actions’ commitments, the balancing value and the burn set, and of these only the burn set names an Asset, by publishing each burnt Asset Base with its amount. The hiding of the Actions’ Asset Bases is Theorem 9.11, in “Security”.
Let
rule (B1) giving
The hypotheses hold for every OrchardZSA bundle of a valid block. Every Action carries its own -byte nullifier (Ironwood Guide, Definition “Action description”; protocol specification, §“Action Description Encoding and Consensus”), and a block, hence a transaction, holds at most bytes (protocol specification, §“Block Header Encoding and Consensus”), so
whatever the carrier. The values are -bit by
Definition 3.1, with
The argument is that of the Ironwood Guide’s Lemma “Modular balance
is integer balance”. Each difference
for , with
the upper end of the range in the protocol specification, §“Balance and
Binding Signature (Orchard)”. Both bounds are below
The protocol specification’s argument in §“Balance and Binding Signature
(Orchard)” bounds the number of Actions by
Fix an OrchardZSA bundle as in Definition 5.4, and let
be the set of points consisting of ,
the Asset Bases of the Actions and the Asset Bases of the burn pairs. An
opening of is a triple
of a point
For openings, is defined for
For the bundle fixed above:
Identity. If
hence
Knowledge. Given openings of every
and
If meets the premise on the bases and some is non-zero modulo , this is a non-trivial relation among values of at distinct inputs.
Consequently, under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions “Discrete
logarithms on Pallas”, “GroupHash as a random oracle” and “The
RedPallas hash as a random oracle”, an efficient party that outputs a
bundle whose set meets the premise on the bases, openings of
every net value commitment and a binding signature under the resulting
on a message of its choice satisfies
Under Assumption 4.9 in addition, let an efficient adversary output OrchardZSA bundles of valid blocks, hence with at most Actions each, whose Action proofs and binding signatures verify and whose witnessed and burn-pair Asset Bases meet the premise on the bases. Then, except with negligible probability, as integers:
for every Asset Base
no burn pair has an Asset Base that no Action witnesses;
the signer knows the trapdoor sum .
Here , , and are read from the extracted witnesses. Status (Definition 1.3): proved here for the specified ; conditional on Assumption 4.9, which concerns the designed but unspecified circuit, and not on Assumption 6.13. The premise on the bases is discharged for every accepted bundle of a valid chain only in “Security”, in Theorem 9.5: for witnessed bases by Corollary 9.4, for burn-pair bases by rule (T4) of Construction 7.3 and Lemma 7.7. ZIP 226 argues per-Asset balance in rationale only (“Rationale for Value Balance Verification”), and that argument stays designed but unspecified.
(i) Expand each and apply the additive homomorphism (Crypto Guide, §“The Pedersen commitment”, Theorem “Additive homomorphism”):
By (B3) each Asset Base of a burn pair occurs in exactly one subtracted term , and by (B1) none of them is , whose only subtracted term is . Subtracting these terms as in Definition 5.4 and grouping by base gives the identity. If every vanishes modulo , the right-hand side is .
(ii) With the openings in place of the honest values, the same grouping
gives
Consequence. Let an efficient party output, with probability
, a bundle meeting the premise, openings, a message and a binding
signature on it under the resulting , with some
non-zero modulo ; the event is efficiently decidable from the
output. The value is extracted exactly as in the proof of the
Ironwood Guide’s Proposition “Balance and key knowledge”: if
Bundles. The adversary outputs polynomially many bundles, and the union
bound reduces the claim to one of them, as in the proof of the
Ironwood Guide’s Theorem “Balance”. The algorithm that runs the
adversary with the extractor of Assumption 4.9 outputs, for
that bundle, the triples
The premise on the bases cannot be dropped, for witnessed bases or for
the bases of burn pairs. For witnessed bases this is
Proposition 4.1. For burn pairs, let be the Asset
Base of an issued Asset and
whose discrete logarithm the author knows, so the binding signature verifies. Likewise, with balancing value , ZEC Actions whose net values sum to and the pair give
an amount of zatoshi of ZEC appears from nothing, and (B1) does not
exclude the pair, since
ZIP 226, “Rationale for Value Balance Verification”, states that the
relation between and holds “if and only
if”, per Custom Asset, the net values sum to the burnt amount ( if
absent) and, for ZEC, to the balancing value, and that the commitments
“add up homomorphically only with respect to the same value base point”.
Neither is a literal statement about the Pallas group. The group is cyclic
of prime order (protocol specification, §“Pallas and
Vesta”), so any two non-identity bases satisfy