This section constructs the identity of an Asset in dependency order: the issuance key pair, the issuance authorisation signature scheme and the issuer identifier (§2.1); the asset description and the Asset Identifier (§2.2); the Asset Digest, the Asset Base and its byte encoding (§2.3); and the Asset Base of the Native Asset (§2.4). Every construction of the section is taken from ZIP 227 and ZIP 226, both Draft. The results of the section separate Assets computationally: distinct pairs of issuer and description yield distinct Asset Identifiers and distinct Asset Bases, and no Asset Base of a Custom Asset coincides with a fixed generator of the Orchard protocol, except with negligible probability.
Throughout, denotes the set of byte strings of length and the set of byte strings of arbitrary length; denotes concatenation. For a -byte personalisation and a byte string , and denote unkeyed BLAKE2b with personalisation , input and an output of and bytes respectively (protocol specification, §“BLAKE2 Hash Functions”). The former is the function of the Ironwood Guide, §“Transaction digests and signatures”.
The issuance authorising key is a byte string
The issuance authorisation signature scheme is a digital signature scheme in the sense of the Crypto Guide’s Definition “Digital signature scheme” (protocol specification, §“Signature”), instantiated as BIP-340 Schnorr signatures over secp256k1 with the standard secp256k1 parameters (Crypto Guide, §“The transparent layer’s schemes: ECDSA and BIP-340 over secp256k1”, Construction “BIP-340 Schnorr over secp256k1, schematically”; cited, not re-derived). Let be the order of the secp256k1 group. The types are
a public key being the -byte big-endian -coordinate of BIP 340. The algorithms are the following.
The algorithm returns the BIP-340 public key of , or exactly when BIP-340 key derivation fails, that is, when read as a big-endian integer is or at least .
The algorithm runs BIP-340 signing on
under with auxiliary data
The algorithm returns
if
ZIP 227 writes the verification key in as , although the parameter is named ; the reading is the only one that type-checks. Batch verification MAY be used; precomputation MAY be used if and only if it produces equivalent results (ZIP 227, “Issuance Authorization Signature Scheme”, “Orchard ZSA Issuance Authorization Signature Scheme”, “Derivation of issuance validating key” and “Issuance Authorization Signing and Validation”). Class: specified.
The scheme , with key generation that samples
uniformly from conditioned on
The assumption is justified, not proved. The Crypto Guide’s Theorem
“EUF-CMA security of Schnorr signatures in the ROM” (§“Security in the
random oracle model and the forking lemma”) proves the property for Schnorr
signatures under the discrete-logarithm assumption, and that volume’s remark
following Construction “BIP-340 Schnorr over secp256k1, schematically”
carries the proof to BIP-340 with the tagged challenge hash
modelled as a random oracle. With fixed,
the nonce is for
the secret
For
The encoding occurs only in the field of the Issuance Bundle of “Issuance Actions and Issuance Bundles” (§6.2). No transaction format carrying that field is specified.
An asset description is a byte string chosen by the issuer, carrying any information about the issuance. ZIP 227 requires it to be non-empty and states that it SHOULD be a well-formed UTF-8 code-unit sequence according to Unicode 15.0.0 or later; no maximum length is imposed (ZIP 227, “ZIP 227 Asset Identifiers”). Only its hash (Definition 2.6) is visible to consensus, so neither non-emptiness nor the UTF-8 condition can be enforced by consensus: both are issuer-side conventions. Within the scope of one issuer, distinct Assets are obtained from distinct descriptions. Class: specified.
For an issuer identifier
The pair is the Asset Identifier and its canonical encoding (ZIP 227, “ZIP 227 Asset Identifiers”). The leading byte of the encoding is a version byte, reserving room for other issuance protocols; it is distinct in role from the scheme byte that begins , so every current encoding begins with two bytes of different meaning. The encoding is injective, since its three components have the fixed lengths , and bytes. Class: specified.
Consider two distinct pairs of issuer identifier and asset description, and , with Asset Identifiers and .
If
If
Hence, under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “Collision resistance of BLAKE2b”, no efficient algorithm outputs two distinct pairs of issuer and description with equal Asset Identifiers, or with equal encodings , except with negligible probability. Status: proved here for the specified construction; conditional on no unspecified object.
The issuer identifier is a component of , so distinct
issuers give distinct pairs, which is claim 1. For one issuer the
descriptions differ, and equal identifiers mean equal values
on distinct descriptions, a BLAKE2b-256 collision
under one personalisation; this is claim 2. An algorithm that outputs such
a collision outputs two distinct inputs
The requirement of ZIP 226, “Asset Identifiers”, that every new Asset have a new and unique Asset Identifier is met by the choice of a new description. ZIP 227, “Rationale”, argues the separation of issuers informally; that argument is a rationale of the ZIP, whose class is designed but unspecified, and Proposition 2.7 supplies its proof. Since the proposition separates Assets only through the issuer and any issuer may reuse any description, ZIP 227, “ZIP 227 Asset Identifiers”, requires that wallets MUST NOT display alone as the name of an Asset (see also ZIP 227, “Displaying Asset Identifier information to users”).
OrchardZSA adds three inputs of to those of the Orchard protocol, which the Ironwood Guide lists in its table of §“GroupHash, domain separation, and nothing-up-my-sleeve generators”. Table 3 lists them as strings, each with the subsection that uses it (ZIP 227, “OrchardZSA Asset Bases”; ZIP 226, “Split Notes” and “Note Structure and Commitment”). The objects they define are constructed at their uses.
| Domain separator | Message | Use | Subsection |
|---|---|---|---|
| z.cash:OrchardZSA | -byte Asset Digest | Asset Base of a Custom Asset | §2.3 |
| z.cash:Orchard | L | additional term of a split nullifier | §4.2 |
| z.cash:SinsemillaQ | z.cash:ZSA-NoteCommit-M | hash base, Custom Asset note commitment | §3.2 |
The input pairs of Table 3 are pairwise distinct and distinct from every input pair of the Ironwood Guide’s table of §“GroupHash, domain separation, and nothing-up-my-sleeve generators”. Hence, under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “GroupHash as a random oracle”, the values of at all these pairs are independent uniform points of , and, under that assumption and the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “Discrete logarithms on Pallas”, that volume’s Lemma “Relations among fixed generators” applies to any polynomial collection of them together with the Orchard generators. Status: proved here; conditional on no unspecified object.
The separator z.cash:OrchardZSA occurs in no row of the Orchard table. Under z.cash:Orchard the Orchard table has only the messages G and K, both distinct from L. Under z.cash:SinsemillaQ it has only the messages z.cash:Orchard-NoteCommit-M, z.cash:Orchard-CommitIvk-M and z.cash:Orchard-MerkleCRH, all distinct from z.cash:ZSA-NoteCommit-M. The three new pairs have pairwise distinct separators or messages. The map from to the input hashed by is injective, as the Ironwood Guide’s Remark “Domain separation” records, so distinct pairs are distinct oracle inputs; the random-oracle assumption then gives independent uniform values, and the cited lemma applies verbatim, its hypothesis being only that the inputs are distinct. □
The Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “Collision resistance of BLAKE2b” concerns the -byte output only. The Asset Digest is a -byte output, hence a separate assumption.
No efficient algorithm outputs, except with negligible probability, two
inputs
For the Asset Identifier of a Custom Asset, the Asset Digest is
For
with the Ironwood Guide’s Construction “GroupHash on Pallas” (protocol specification, §“Group Hash into Pallas and Vesta”); no cofactor is cleared. The separator gives a string within the -byte bound of that construction. The Asset Base of the Asset is
(ZIP 227, “Asset Digests”, “Asset Bases” and “OrchardZSA Asset Bases”). The subscript is dropped when the identifier is clear. The whole chain, from issuer and description to Asset Base, is
Class: specified.
The Asset Identifier is global across the shielded protocols that support Zcash Shielded Assets; the Asset Base is per protocol, the map being instantiated per protocol, here for OrchardZSA (ZIP 227, “Asset Identifier”, “Asset Bases”).
Let
Under the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “GroupHash as a random
oracle”, for every
and an algorithm that makes queries to the oracle finds an Asset Identifier whose Asset Base is with probability at most , the inputs of its output being counted among the queries. Status: proved here; conditional on no unspecified object.
In the model each value is uniform on the Pallas group, of order (Ironwood Guide, §“Fields, groups, and encodings”), so it is with probability . A union bound over the queries gives the second claim. □
The map has no case for the identity, and ZIP 227 states no rule for an issuance whose derived Asset Base is . The typing in of the Asset Base of an Issue Note and of the domain of the issuance state makes such an issuance unconstructible, hence invalid. Class: specified; the rejection follows from the normative typing in , and ZIP 227 states no separate rule. By Lemma 2.11 the event has negligible probability.
Let the Ironwood Guide’s Assumption “GroupHash as a random oracle” hold, and consider an algorithm that makes queries to , the inputs of its output being counted among the queries.
The map
If the algorithm outputs
on distinct encodings, or it is in an event of probability at most .
It outputs an Asset Identifier whose Asset Base equals one of fixed generators, among them , and , each the value of at an input of the Orchard table or of Table 3 other than the first row, with probability at most .
Hence, under Assumption 2.9, the Ironwood Guide’s Assumptions “Collision resistance of BLAKE2b” and “GroupHash as a random oracle”, and by Proposition 2.7, distinct pairs yield distinct Asset Bases, and no Asset Base of a Custom Asset is an Orchard generator, except with negligible probability. Status: proved here for the specified chain; conditional on no unspecified object.
Claim 1. The map is defined on all pairs in
Claim 2. By the injectivity of
(Definition 2.6), distinct identifiers have distinct
encodings; equal digests of distinct encodings are a BLAKE2b-512 collision
under ZSA-Asset-Digest. Otherwise the digests are distinct, hence
distinct oracle inputs under z.cash:OrchardZSA, whose values are
independent uniform points in the model. Among queried inputs two share
a value with probability at most
Claim 3. By Lemma 2.8 every input under z.cash:OrchardZSA differs from the inputs of the generators, so each queried Asset Base is uniform and independent of them, and equals a given one with probability . A union bound over the queries and the generators gives .
The final sentence composes claims 2 and 3 with Proposition 2.7: distinct pairs of issuer and description yield distinct identifiers except with negligible probability, distinct identifiers yield distinct Asset Bases except with negligible probability by claim 2 and Assumption 2.9, and the bounds of claims 2 and 3 are negligible for polynomial and . □
The byte encoding of an Asset Base is the -byte string
with and the star encoding those of the Ironwood Guide, §“Fields, groups, and encodings”, Definitions “Integer and byte encodings” and “Star encoding” (ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment”). It is typed as a byte string throughout, although ZIP 226 also types it as a bit string in its clause on the note plaintext. The encoding is canonical on the Pallas group, by the canonicity of the star encoding established after the same Definition; ZIP 226 notes that canonicity may fail for future shielded protocols. Class: specified; its carrier is not.
The placements of in a note plaintext and in the entries of a burn set are encodings of ZIP 230, which is Withdrawn; they are not specified.
| Object | Bytes | Defined in | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition 2.2 | ZIP 227, “Derivation of issuance validating key” | ||
| Definition 2.4 | ZIP 227, “Issuer Identifier” | ||
| Definition 2.4 | ZIP 227, “Issuance Authorization Signing and Validation” | ||
| Definition 2.6 | ZIP 227, “ZIP 227 Asset Identifiers” | ||
| Definition 2.6 | ZIP 227, “ZIP 227 Asset Identifiers” | ||
| Construction 2.10 | ZIP 227, “Asset Digests” | ||
| Definition 2.14 | ZIP 226, “Note Structure and Commitment” |
Every formula of the chain is specified, in Draft ZIP text: the issuance keys and , the identifier , the hash , the identifier and its encoding, the Asset Digest, the Asset Base, its encoding and the Native Asset Base of §2.4. The identity case is specified, by typing (Remark 2.12). The encodings that would carry the chain on chain belong to the carrier.
The Native Asset, ZEC on Mainnet and TAZ on Testnet (ZIP 227, “Terminology”), has no Asset Identifier under ZIP 227 and does not pass through the chain of Construction 2.10. Its Asset Base is fixed as
the value base of the Ironwood Guide’s Definition “Net value
commitment” (§“Value commitments”), where and its
companion
The value commitment and the note commitment of a Native Asset note are
computed by the Orchard formulas. Two things differ: the derivation of
takes the OrchardZSA lead byte (Remark 3.6),
and the note plaintext carries
(Definition 3.7; ZIP 226, “Note Structure and
Commitment”). The value commitment of ZIP 226, “Value Commitment”, is