This section describes the ZIP-259
draft, a proposal rather than a deployed upgrade, which combines four
changes: shorter blocks with limits on shielded work
(ZIP-218), removal of 60 % of
transaction fees from circulation
(ZIP-235), reissuance that preserves the
halving schedule — periodic divisions of scheduled subsidy by two
(ZIP-237) —
and rejection of version 4 transactions
(ZIP-2003). Three amendments adjust the
existing funding streams: Revision 3 of ZIP-214 rescales their end heights
to the new spacing (Section 8.7), Revision 2 of
ZIP-207 rescales the periods for which each recipient address is used, and
ZIP-2008 changes one stream’s recipient address. The activation height,
denoted A , must be a multiple of three (Revision 3 of ZIP-214). At the
source boundary of Section 1.1, ZIP-259 sets
NU7 introduces no new transaction format: versions 5 and 6 remain available. Their signatures nevertheless commit to a consensus branch identifier, a value identifying the network upgrade’s rules. An unchanged encoding therefore does not make a pre-NU7 signature valid under NU7. Disabling version 4 also disables spending funds in Sprout, an older shielded pool, because the newer formats cannot represent its transfers; it does not transfer their value to a reserve or remove it from the supply.
The most-work rule of Definition 2.2, which compares the sum of the blocks’ work rather than their count, is unchanged. Changing target spacing changes neither the work definition nor this ordering.
The specification and Rosenfeld’s model prefer, at equal cumulative work,
the leaf received first. Zebra applies the same rule from version 6.4.0,
released on 23 September 2026: of two chains with equal work it keeps the
one whose leaf it received first, and compares leaf hashes only between
leaves whose receipt times it cannot order. A tying branch that reaches a
node after the public leaf therefore does not displace it there, as the
strict-overtake boundary
Assumption 4.2 fixes difficulty; Zcash retargets after every block. In ZIP-218, the NU7 target spacing is 25 seconds and the target-averaging window is 102 blocks. The timestamps determining the adjustment still come from the branch being evaluated, including on an attacker’s private branch.
Write
The specification’s §7.7.3 defines the rest of the calculation. For a block height h , let m (h) be the median timestamp of the eleven preceding blocks: their sixth-smallest timestamp. Let t ̄ (h) be the mean target of the N blocks preceding h : the sum of their targets divided by N . Define the observed and damped timespans by
| a (h) | = m (h) − m (h − N), | ||
| d (h) | = T + trunc (a (h) − T 4), |
where trunc discards the fractional part towards zero.
The bounded timespan c (h) is d (h) clamped between
⌊ 0.84 T ⌋ and ⌊ 1.32 T ⌋ : values below the
lower endpoint are replaced by that endpoint, and similarly above the
upper endpoint. The maximum target PoWLimit is
| t (h) = min (PoWLimit, ⌊ t ̄ (h) T ⌋ c (h)), |
followed by the compact encoding defined in the specification’s
§7.7.4.
The order of the floor and multiplication matters. At NU7 the clamp
endpoints are
Activation does not reset the accumulated work or multiply the target by
three in a single operation. The averaging window of the first NU7 blocks
still covers pre-NU7 history and adjust through the same bounded rule. Likewise,
the timestamp rules do not shrink with the target spacing: a timestamp must
exceed the median of the preceding eleven and be at most 90 minutes
above it (§7.6).
A further check, not a consensus rule, rejects received blocks more than two
hours ahead of the validator’s clock. Testnet’s exceptional
minimum-difficulty rule sets a block’s target to PoWLimit when its
timestamp exceeds its predecessor’s by strictly more than a threshold. At
the Testnet NU7 activation height the threshold changes from six to
eighteen target spacings, so it remains
The averaging window, damping, and clamp constrain the adjustment but do not prove that two forked branches retain close targets. Work per block moves inversely with the target; a branch’s timestamps can change both its future block rate and the work carried by each block. Equal expected work production does not make the probability of an eventual overtake independent of these jump sizes. Consequently, the probability tables are an equal-work baseline, not an exact analysis of private branches whose difficulty schedules diverge.
Zcash’s proof of work is Equihash with parameters
The specification nowhere asserts progress-freeness — the argument is this volume’s, not a citation. What Equihash changes is the granularity: candidates arrive in batches, one batch per memory-hard solver run. Progress within a run is discarded when a competing block arrives. Under independent identically distributed runs, the number of runs until an accepted header is geometric; replacing those discrete completion times by an exponential clock is a further approximation, coarse within one run and good only when a run is short relative to the target spacing: 25 seconds in the NU7 draft. Run duration is implementation- and hardware-dependent and is not quantified here. A proof of work whose solve time is comparable to the spacing would make block discovery visibly non-exponential and move the attribution sequence away from that of Proposition 3.4.
Consensus does not impose a maximum reorganisation depth. ZIP-218
recommends a node-local 600 -block rollback window: at the target spacing
this is
A finite rollback policy truncates some paths to eventual overtake, so the unlimited-rollback probability r (q, n) is not the exact failure probability of a node enforcing that policy. A limit is also not global agreement: different nodes may stop on different sides of a long split. The specification’s §3.3 adds a separate requirement for validators that risk Mainnet funds or display transaction information: their chain must include the activation block of the most recent settled network upgrade. That socially anchored checkpoint is distinct from probabilistic finality.
A transparent output records its value and destination in cleartext.
The consensus maturity rule prevents spending such an output of a coinbase
until the spending block is at least 100 heights later
(§7.1.2).
ZIP-218 keeps that count, a nominal
In the model, maturity is a confirmation count fixed by consensus. A spend
can enter a block only once the coinbase’s block has 100 confirmations on
the chain that the spend extends. A private branch forked below the coinbase
block, under the conventions of Theorem 5.2, therefore removes
a newly mature output from the best chain with probability r (q, 100) .
Computed by script,
A wallet can distinguish trusted outputs that its own transaction handling can recreate after a rollback from an untrusted external payment that may require the sender to pay again. The draft ZIP-315 recommends three confirmations for the former and ten for the latter, and exempts the shielding of transparent funds from its three-confirmation minimum. The examined wallet backend follows both, allowing zero-confirmation shielding by default. These choices are not consensus rules.
Table 1 quantifies their modelled trade-off: three confirmations assign a 10 % attacker risk 1.712 % , while ten assign the same attacker about 0.0008 % and a 20 % attacker about 0.316 % . The count remains a (q, ε) policy, not a guarantee.
The anchor is the note-commitment-tree root against which a spend
proves membership (Crypto Guide, §Privacy-preserving membership
via zero-knowledge paths). ZIP-218 keeps at three blocks the anchor depth
that ZIP-315 recommends. ZIP-218 also recommends a transaction-expiry
delta of 120 blocks, a nominal
Table 5 collects the safeguards of Sections 8.2 to 8.5. Four are consensus rules, which decide block validity; the rollback window is node policy, and the confirmation counts and anchor depth are wallet policy, which govern only a node’s or a wallet’s own conduct. Every value is specified, in the protocol specification or in a draft ZIP at the source boundary of Section 1.1; none is designed but unspecified.
| Safeguard | Value | At 25 s | Standing | Model assumption |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Difficulty adjustment | every block; window N = 102 ( 17 before NU7); damping 4 ; clamps ⌊ 0.84 T ⌋ and ⌊ 1.32 T ⌋ | T = 2, 550 s; clamps 2, 142 and 3, 366 s | consensus, §7.7.3; N = 102 draft ZIP-218 | constant difficulty (Assumption 4.2), replaced (Remark 8.2) |
| Timestamp bounds | above the median of the 11 preceding timestamps; at most 90 min above it | 216 spacings | consensus, §7.6 | constant difficulty: bounds the timestamps that set a branch’s targets |
| Proof of work | Equihash (200, 9) , then SHA-256d header hash at most the target | — | consensus, §7.7.1, §7.7.2 | exponential clocks (Remark 3.7), coarsened by solver runs |
| Rollback window | 600 blocks | 250 min | node policy: §3.3 permits one; draft ZIP-218 | unlimited rollback (Remark 8.3) |
| Coinbase maturity | 100 blocks, transparent outputs | 41.7 min | consensus, §7.1.2; kept by draft ZIP-218 | none; fixes n = 100 |
| Wallet confirmations | 3 trusted, 10 untrusted | 75 , 250 s | wallet policy, draft ZIP-315 | none; a choice of (q, ε) |
| Anchor depth | 3 blocks | 75 s | wallet policy, draft ZIP-315 and ZIP-218 | none; outside the race |
A byte limit does not directly bound the computational work inside a
block. The
An Orchard Action pairs one spend slot with one output slot; dummy slots allow either side to carry no real transfer. Ironwood is the newer shielded pool using the same Action structure (ZIP-229). The older Sapling shielded pool counts spends and outputs separately; its cryptographic construction is not needed for this accounting.
Let O and I count Orchard and Ironwood Actions in a block, let S
count Sapling spends plus outputs, and let J count Sprout transfers
(JoinSplits), each of which creates two notes. ZIP-218 bounds each pool and
charges all of them to one shared budget,
| O ≤ 330, I ≤ 330, S ≤ 300, J ≤ 0, O + I + S + 2 J ≤ 330 . |
The final inequality is shared across pools: their separate maxima cannot
all be filled in one block. For example,
At two Actions per transaction, Orchard and Ironwood transactions together
fit at most 165 per block under this budget, or a nominal
A zatoshi is the atomic currency unit: 1 ZEC equals 10 8
zatoshi. A halving divides the scheduled subsidy by two. Retaining its
nominal wall-clock interval while tripling block frequency requires both
three times as many blocks per interval and one third of the subsidy per
block. ZIP-218 therefore changes the full interval from
The halving count after activation retains the progress already made
towards the next halving. Let H B be the Blossom activation height:
| k (h) | = ⌊ H B − 10, 000 840, 000 + A − H B 1, 680, 000 + h − A 5, 040, 000 ⌋, | (4) | ||
| s h | = ⌊ M 2 ⋅ 3 ⋅ 2 k (h) ⌋ . | (5) |
The factors 2 and 3 account separately for Blossom’s and NU7’s
spacing changes. If activation occurs during the second-halving era,
The old Mainnet third-halving height
| H 3 NU7 = A + 3 (H 3 − A) = 13, 219, 200 − 2 A . |
On Testnet, where
Retiming the halving function does not by itself retime a funding stream
whose end is a literal block height. Revision 3 of ZIP-214 supplies that
change: the two streams that end at the old third halving, of 8 % and
12 % of the block subsidy, end at H 3 NU7 instead. Each
stream receives the floor of its share, so at
The Network Sustainability Mechanism (NSM) separates temporarily removed funds from the still-unissued scheduled subsidy. In ZIP-237, the issued supply V h is the total value recorded in the chain’s value pools after block h . Each pool is a separately tracked balance for one part of the protocol; tracking a shielded pool’s total does not reveal the values of its individual notes. The NSM reserve R h , which ZIP-237 calls the NSM Value Balance, records value removed from circulation and not yet reissued. The reserve is public consensus state, not a spendable pool or an account with a spending key. In particular, it is not 21 million ZEC minus the issued supply: that larger difference also includes future scheduled issuance.
The initial reserve recovers the historical subsidy and fees that miners
left unclaimed before NU6. Since
ZIP-236, a coinbase must account for
its full available value, so that historical shortfall is fixed. The draft
defines the seed R A − 1 as total scheduled issuance through the last
pre-NU6 block minus issued supply there, and states the measured values:
Let d h be the number of zatoshi removed from circulation in block h . NU7 deploys one removal mechanism, ZIP-235; ZIP-259 excludes the voluntary removal of ZIP-233. With F h the total fee paid by the non-coinbase transactions of block h ,
| d h = ⌊ 6 F h 10 ⌋, |
computed once from the block’s total fee. The coinbase’s total input value
(specification
§7.1.2)
counts
With
| f = ⌊ 6, 931, 680, 000 / L ⌋ 10 10 = 1375 10 10 . |
Reissuance starts at a height D that ZIP-237 derives from the scheduled
subsidy alone, independently of actual removals. Let C h be cumulative
scheduled issuance through height h , with the pre-NU7 subsidies below A
and s h from A , and let H 3 NU7 and H 4 NU7 be
the heights at which k (h) of equation (4) first
reaches 3 and 4 . Then D is the least h with
| ⌈ f (2.1 ⋅ 10 15 − C h − 1) ⌉ < s h, |
the first block at which reissuing the fraction f of the cap’s unissued
remainder, rounded up, would pay less than the scheduled subsidy; the cap
| 2.1 ⋅ 10 15 − C h − 1 ≤ ⌊ 26, 041, 665 ⋅ 10 10 1375 ⌋ = 189, 393, 927, 272, 727 . |
Let H 2 be the pre-NU7 second-halving height:
| D = H 3 NU7 + 2, 807, 274, |
about 2.2 years of 25 -second blocks after the third halving:
The additional subsidy u h , total block subsidy b h , and reserve update are
| u h | = { 0, h < D, ⌈ f R h − 1 ⌉, h ≥ D, | (6) | ||
| b h | = s h + u h, R h = R h − 1 − u h + d h . | (7) |
All amounts are integers in zatoshi. Reissuance uses the previous block’s
reserve, so a removal in the current block cannot finance its own
additional subsidy. Before D , removals accumulate without payout. After
D , a positive reserve pays at least one zatoshi: because R is an
integer and
For a small exact example, take
Transfers between ordinary value pools cancel in their total. A block increases that total by its subsidy and reduces it by its removals:
| V h − V h − 1 = s h + u h − d h, (V h + R h) − (V h − 1 + R h − 1) = s h . |
The second identity follows by adding the reserve update; reissuance moves value between the two ledgers without creating a second copy. Scheduled issuance retains its halvings, with the reserve paying an additional amount on top. Funding streams, wherever active, take their prescribed fractions of the total subsidy b h , not only s h . The resulting subsidy depends on prior chain state as well as height.
Without integer rounding and new removals, the recurrence becomes