Theorem 5.2 reduces the double-spend success probability to the function r (q, n) of the attacker’s share and the confirmation count, tabulated in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 3. This section tabulates the confirmation counts required for three risk targets, proves that no finite count has zero risk (Proposition 6.1) and that the required count diverges as q approaches 1 2 (Proposition 6.2), and converts confirmation counts into wall-clock time at the Zcash block spacing.
| q | r < 10 % | r < 1 % | r < 0.1 % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 % | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 % | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 8 % | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| 10 % | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| 15 % | 3 | 6 | 9 |
| 20 % | 4 | 8 | 13 |
| 25 % | 5 | 12 | 20 |
| 30 % | 9 | 20 | 32 |
| 35 % | 15 | 36 | 58 |
| 40 % | 34 | 82 | 133 |
| 45 % | 135 | 331 | 539 |
For every
By Theorem 5.2,
Fix a target
First, n ε (q) exists. The event A n that the attacker reaches
n blocks first is the event that at least n of the first
| r (q, n) = 2 P r [A n] ≤ (4 p q) n p ⟶ 0, |
because
For fixed n the function
The paper (§5): “There is nothing special about the default, often-cited figure of 6 confirmations. It was chosen based on the assumption that an attacker is unlikely to amass more than 10% of the hashrate, and that a negligible risk of less than 0.1% is acceptable. Both these figures are arbitrary” — six confirmations are “overkill for casual attackers, and at the same time powerless against more dedicated attackers”. Table 2 replaces that figure: a policy fixes the attacker share to be withstood and the acceptable risk, and the table gives the corresponding n . The pair (q, ε) is chosen by policy; the model does not determine it.
By Corollary 4.7, the success probability depends on the confirmation count, not on elapsed time. The wall-clock duration of a count is set by the target spacing: 25 seconds in ZIP-218. While the attacker mines in private, only the honest share of the hashrate extends the public chain, and the merchant’s wait lengthens accordingly.
Only honest blocks extend the public chain, and the honest network’s clock
has rate
| E [S n] = ∫ 0 ∞ s f n (s) d s = n λ ∫ 0 ∞ f n + 1 (s) d s = n T 0 p . ∎ |
Table 3 evaluates Proposition 6.4 for
every count of Table 2, against the attacker share for
which that count was computed, taking
| r < 10 % | r < 1 % | r < 0.1 % | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| q | n | min | n | min | n | min |
| 2 % | 1 | 0.4 | 2 | 0.9 | 3 | 1.3 |
| 5 % | 2 | 0.9 | 3 | 1.3 | 4 | 1.8 |
| 8 % | 2 | 0.9 | 3 | 1.4 | 5 | 2.3 |
| 10 % | 2 | 0.9 | 4 | 1.9 | 6 | 2.8 |
| 15 % | 3 | 1.5 | 6 | 2.9 | 9 | 4.4 |
| 20 % | 4 | 2.1 | 8 | 4.2 | 13 | 6.8 |
| 25 % | 5 | 2.8 | 12 | 6.7 | 20 | 11.1 |
| 30 % | 9 | 5.4 | 20 | 11.9 | 32 | 19.0 |
| 35 % | 15 | 9.6 | 36 | 23.1 | 58 | 37.2 |
| 40 % | 34 | 23.6 | 82 | 56.9 | 133 | 92.4 |
| 45 % | 135 | 102.3 | 331 | 250.8 | 539 | 408.3 |
A nominal thirty-minute wait yields 72 confirmations at 25 -second
spacing and three at Bitcoin’s 600 -second spacing.
The corresponding strict-overtake probabilities against a 10 % attacker
are approximately
The comparison holds q fixed. The model contains no network, so it omits the honest work lost when honest blocks race one another during propagation; quantifying that loss requires a propagation distribution and a mining topology. A policy that waits for a fixed amount of accumulated miner reward measures a different quantity: if the reward per block decreases in proportion to the target spacing, reaching that amount requires proportionally more blocks, and, ignoring transaction fees (value paid for transaction inclusion) and rounding, the spacing cancels out of the mean wait. The monetary and fixed-hashrate models are therefore not interchangeable.
Three assumptions of the model fail on the deployed chain and limit how far the calculations transfer to it. (i) Difficulty is not constant: Zcash retunes the target after every block (Section 8.2). The race is scored in work, not block counts; the share q approximates the attacker’s share of work production while the branches’ block weights remain close, and once their difficulty schedules diverge, the equal-step random-walk formula is no longer exact. (ii) Hashrate is not constant: the share q in the theorems is the share the attacker sustains for the duration of the attack; the paper’s caveat is that T 0 re-enters only if the attacker cannot sustain his hashrate long enough, which it judges unlikely for a serious attacker. (iii) Propagation is not instantaneous: honest blocks found concurrently compete during propagation, and the work of the losing block is wasted, which raises the attacker’s effective share; the size of this effect is not quantified here. A fourth limitation lies outside the model: the attacker of this volume obeys the protocol’s validity rules and attacks only the choice between valid histories. Other volumes treat attacks on the rules themselves.