The probabilities of Section 5 assume that the
customer is an attacker. Following the paper’s §6, this section derives
the payment value below which the attack has non-positive expected profit
(Proposition 7.1) and tabulates it in units of block
income. Throughout,
The attacker targets k merchants simultaneously with payments of v
each, all invalidated by the same private branch; the goods are worth
α v to him,
Given success probability r and the gains and losses stipulated above, the attacker’s expected profit over not attacking is
| k α v − (1 − r) (k v + o B) = k v (α + r − 1) − (1 − r) o B, |
positive if and only if
| v > (1 − r) o B k (α + r − 1) |
(when
| v ≤ o (1 − r) B k (α + r − 1) = α = 1 o k ⋅ B (1 − r) r, | (3) |
which with the paper’s choices
The gain k α v is certain (the goods are obtained either way);
the loss
The block subsidy is value issued by the protocol in a block, distinct from fees transferred by its transactions. Its scheduled component is base issuance determined by height, before any reserve payout. A funding stream is a required allocation of a share of that subsidy to a designated recipient. The coinbase is the block’s first transaction, which distributes the available subsidy and fees according to the applicable rules. The reserve is the accounting balance of funds removed from circulation and awaiting reissuance.
The income B forfeited by an orphaned block is the amount its miner would
have retained: miner subsidy plus retained transaction fees, not the
subsidy allocated to other recipients. Under NU7, from activation until
the scheduled subsidy next halves, the miner subsidy is
Instead, Table 4 measures transaction value in units of
the chosen block income B . With the paper’s
| v B ≤ 4 1 − r r . |
Once a particular threat model supplies B , multiplying by it gives the corresponding monetary threshold. Treating B as constant over the attack remains a modelling assumption.
| q | n = 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 % | 36 | 271 | 10, 327 | 344, 743 | 10, 931, 506 | 336, 737, 801 |
| 10 % | 16 | 67 | 729 | 6, 759 | 59, 475 | 508, 917 |
| 20 % | 6 | 15 | 55 | 167 | 467 | 1, 262 |
| 30 % | 2 | 5 | 11 | 21 | 35 | 57 |
| 40 % | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
Within the model, a few confirmations make the attack unprofitable for an attacker with a small share at any plausible payment size; against a 30 % attacker, six confirmations make modelled expected profit non-positive only up to about 21 times the assumed block income B . By the geometric decay of Theorem 5.2, the required count grows only logarithmically in the value at stake. These figures are neither exact finite-stop profit calculations nor bounds on deployed rollback risk; changing difficulty and rollback rails require separate modelling.
At
The paper states each limitation of its model. The give-up point