This section states what the server of “The light-client service” (§5) learns about a light wallet. It defines payment-detection privacy and unlinkability as indistinguishability games against the server of Assumption 5.2 and the view on which the server decides; proves that the view is a deterministic function of the chain, a tuple of schedule parameters and transport metadata, never of the wallet’s keys; derives the leakage of range queries, transaction queries, transparent-address queries and submission as instances of that theorem; and closes with a table of the server’s observables and the class of each mitigation.
The server is the node and the proxy together
(Definition 5.1), under
Assumption 5.2: clause (a) makes the response to each
query a function of the server state and the query, and clause (b) is the
power of the adversary. No second adversary is defined. The server
state Σ t at time t is the server’s best chain at t together
with the state of its node’s transaction pool; the latter enters only the
responses of Submit and Status
(Definition 5.9). An evolution is a family
The view V of a wallet is the record of clause (b) of Assumption 5.2: the transcript
| ((c j, q j, a j, t j, r j)) j = 1, ..., J |
of the wallet’s queries in the order issued, each with its connection
c j , its query name q j of Definition 5.10, its
argument tuple a j , its time t j and its response r j ; and, for each
connection c , the transport metadata
Let π be a scheduling policy, a public randomised rule that emits the wallet’s queries, made precise in “Key independence of queries” (§8.2). The payment-detection privacy game PD π is the following indistinguishability game, with the advantage of a distinguishing game of the Crypto Guide, §“Security as a game”, Definition “Security game and advantage”; the adversary is not restricted to polynomial time.
The adversary fixes an evolution Σ , whose chain may contain outputs to either key set, and two configurations (K 0, u) and (K 1, u) with the same u .
The challenger draws a uniform bit
The adversary outputs
Network privacy holds when the endpoint E c of each connection is
drawn afresh, independently of everything else, from a law that does not
depend on which wallet opens the connection. The unlinkability game
UL π , under network privacy, differs in two points: the
adversary fixes Σ and two configurations (K 0, u 0) and
(K 1, u 1) ; and the challenger runs two consecutive synchronisation
sessions, both of wallet 0 when
ZIP 307, “Security Model”, states the goal informally and with a lowercase “should”: the proxy should not learn which transactions received from the chain are addressed to a given light wallet, and, assuming network privacy (“via Tor or similar”), should not be able to link different connections or queries as deriving from the same wallet. It takes the node and proxy combination to be honest but curious, trusted to provide a correct view of the current best chain and to transmit queries and responses faithfully. Game PD π formalises the first sentence and game UL π the second; the trust clause is clause (a) of Assumption 5.2, an assumption distinct from the goal. The chain is common to both worlds of each game. What the chain itself reveals to a party without keys is the subject of the Ironwood Guide, §“Privacy”, Theorem “Privacy of an Action”, whose Remark “Non-claims” excludes wallet and network metadata, the subject of this section.
ZIP 307, “Security Model”, does not address how to spend notes privately. Submission through the same server is nevertheless part of the view of Definition 8.1 and is analysed in “The submission channel” (§8.5). The status of ZIP 307 and of ZIP 314 is that of Table 1. ZIP 314, titled “Privacy upgrades to the Zcash light client protocol”, carries no specification text, so a specified successor to the privacy treatment of ZIP 307 is an open problem (Definition 1.1).
ZIP 307 makes two statements about its interaction of phases A to D (“Scan order”, §6.4). First, since synchronisation proceeds over a broadcast medium, it leaks no information about which transactions interest the client (“Transaction privacy”). Second, the start of each of phases B and D reveals the height to which the client last synchronised, an information leak under the security model, assuming network privacy (“Block privacy via bucketing”). The two statements hold together: the first concerns the content of the responses, the second the bounds of the queries, two components of the view that Theorem 8.8 separates. The second is a leak in UL π , since the resume height links a session to the session that reached it; both are made precise in “Key independence of queries” (§8.2) and “Leakage of range queries” (§8.3).
A light wallet delegates the storage and filtering of the chain to the server and keeps its keys; its note state (Definition 6.7) is rebuilt on the device. What reaches the server is its query schedule, recorded as in Definition 8.1.
Every argument of every query of Definition 5.10 is
one of the following: a block identifier, a height or a block hash
( Block , TreeState ); a pair of heights
Trial decryption and acceptance (Construction 4.8, Definition 4.9), nullifier matching and the search of retained unlinked nullifiers (Construction 6.8), and the assembly of authentication paths from retained information (Definition 7.12, Proposition 7.13) take as inputs the wallet’s keys, responses already received and retained data, and issue no query.
By inspection of the cited definitions. The underlying procedures are the Ironwood Guide’s, §“Trial decryption and note acceptance” (Construction “Trial decryption”) and §“Authentication paths” (Lemma “Authentication paths from public data”), both computed from data already held. □
A scheduling policy π is a public randomised rule that, from the
responses received so far and a tuple L , emits the next query with its
argument, its connection and its time. The schedule parameters L
collect every other input on which the emitted schedule depends: the
wallet birthday (Definition 6.2) and the resume
heights; the bounds, the pool sets and the order of range queries; the
subtree extents requested (Definition 7.16); the
transaction identifiers fetched or queried; the transactions submitted;
the sets of transparent addresses queried; and the policy’s random coins,
a finite bit string that fixes times, orders and connection choices. Every
component takes values in a countable set. Keys enter the schedule only
through L (Lemmas 8.5 and 8.6). Given
Σ , the law of L is induced by the configuration (K, u) . The
endpoints
For random variables X and Y with values in a countable set,
Assume Assumption 5.2, and let π be a scheduling policy. There is a deterministic function F π with
| V = F π (Σ, L, E) . |
Hence:
two wallets with equal L and equal endpoints produce the same view, whatever their keys;
in PD π , with L b the schedule parameters of wallet
b and
| Adv ≤ 1 2 Δ (V 0, V 1) ≤ 1 2 Δ (L 0, L 1), |
and the first bound is attained by an adversary that is not restricted in time; in particular π provides payment-detection privacy if and only if, for every Σ , K 0 , K 1 and u , the view has the same law for K 0 and K 1 , which holds whenever the law of L given Σ is the same for both;
the bounds of (ii) hold for UL π with the pair of the two sessions’ parameter tuples in place of L , the endpoints being independent of b under network privacy.
Privacy holds exactly when the view has the same law for both key sets, and in particular whenever the law of L given Σ does not depend on the wallet’s receipts, its detected notes and spends, or the transparent addresses it watches; each leak of “Leakage of range queries” (§8.3) to “The submission channel” (§8.5) is an instance.
Induction on the transcript. Query j , with its name, argument,
connection and time, is emitted by π from L and responses
For (ii), fix Σ . An adversary is, after its choice, a randomised
decision rule; write
| | ∑ v (Pr [V 1 = v] − Pr [V 0 = v]) D (v) | ≤ ∑ v ∈ S (Pr [V 1 = v] − Pr [V 0 = v]) = Δ (V 0, V 1), |
where S is the set of v with
The response to Blocks (s, e, P) , Block (b) ,
TreeState (b) and SubtreeRoots (pool, i) is
the same for every wallet that issues the same query at the same time. Let
a policy’s shielded synchronisation consist of Tip ,
SubtreeRoots (pool, 0) for each shielded pool,
The first sentence is clause (a) of Assumption 5.2. The rollback heights of Construction 7.24 are functions of H , the stored block hashes and the responses, hence, by the hypothesis on H and on the recorded heights, of Σ , B , the resume heights and the coins. The remainder is Theorem 8.8(i) and (ii) with the listed L , whose law given Σ does not depend on K . □
The hypothesis on times is necessary: a policy that issues its next query when the processing of a range ends, when that processing takes longer for a range with detected notes, puts a function of receipts into the times of L .
Query Utxos (A) puts the addresses of A into L and into the
view in the clear, by declaration,
not by inference, and a query with
Let a wallet watch n transparent addresses and query them one address per
query, in rounds that visit every address once in a uniformly random
order, at times whose successive gaps are independent draws of law
Exp (1 / T) with
The arguments are singletons by construction. The remaining channels are the connection, endpoint and time components of the view, which Theorem 8.8 retains unchanged. The law of the gaps is cited, not derived. □
Let m be the least height of any block that the wallet requests, where
Blocks (s, e, P) requests the heights of [s, e] ,
Block (h) the height h , and TreeState (h) the height
The birthday B is a component of L and m a function of the view; the statement is an instance of Theorem 8.8. □
In the interaction of ZIP 307, “Client-server interaction”, the range of phase B starts at the height X that the previous synchronisation reached, and that of phase D at the height Y that phase B reached. Each start therefore reveals the previous synchronisation height, the tip at the time of the previous session, and so links consecutive sessions: in UL π an adversary that chooses u 1 with a resume height other than the tip returned to the first session wins with probability 1 . Under a prioritised policy the bounds are those of the policy’s ranges (verification ranges near the stored tip, extents of subtrees, historic ranges); they reveal the scan state, the maximum and fully scanned heights of Definition 6.11, to the extent that the ranges are functions of it, and need not equal the previous synchronisation height.
The bounds are components of L , and the statement is an instance of
Theorem 8.8(ii) and (iii). For the adversary: when
The order of range queries is a component of L . A policy that orders its ranges by a wallet-dependent priority (“Scan order”, §6.4, the reference interaction; “Witness readiness”, §7.5, scheduling) reveals that order, by Theorem 8.8. Every such priority is designed but unspecified (Definition 1.1).
Let a policy, on detecting a note at position p of pool P , always
request the block extent of subtree
The requested extent is a function of p , a receipt, and a component of
L ; the map from extent bounds to s is public. Wallet 0 issues the
extent query and wallet 1 does not, so the adversary that outputs
Fix a bucket size
Under Construction 8.16 the start of a range of phase B or D reveals ⌊ X ⌋ N and no more of the resume height X : two wallets whose resume heights share a bucket and whose parameter tuples agree elsewhere issue ranges with equal starts. The ends of the ranges, their order and their timing are unchanged, and so is their leakage. The gain is in the set of resume heights consistent with a start, from one height to one bucket of N heights; it is not an advantage bound of UL π , in which an adversary that chooses u 1 with a resume height in another bucket still wins with probability 1 .
A query Tx (txid) or Status (txid) issued without cover puts that transaction into L and reveals it as one that the wallet is fetching or tracking: a received transaction whose memo or outgoing plaintext the wallet recovers (the retrieval of Construction 6.8), a sent one, or a transparent dependency. This is the set that payment-detection privacy protects. Against a policy that fetches exactly its wallet-relevant transactions, an adversary in PD π that places an output to K 0 alone, at a height that the common schedule scans before the horizon, and chooses K 1 with no receipt in Σ , wins with probability 1 . A transaction identifier queried in two sessions links them in UL π .
The fetched set is a function of receipts and a component of L . Wallet 0 fetches the transaction of the output and wallet 1 does not; the statement is an instance of Theorem 8.8(ii) and (iii). □
ZIP 307, “Transaction privacy”, states the following interoperability rules. A light client needs full transactions for the memo fields of received notes and for outgoing ciphertexts, to recover spend information when a seed is imported. It SHOULD obscure the exact transactions of interest by also downloading numerous uninteresting transactions; it SHOULD download all transactions of any block from which it fetches a single full transaction; and it MUST convey to the user that fetching full transactions reduces privacy. The MUST is unconditional, not a fallback for omitting the SHOULDs. Under the second SHOULD the fetched set reveals the blocks that hold a transaction of interest, not the transactions. The rules are specified (Definition 1.1).
No query of Definition 5.10 returns the full transactions of a block, since Block returns the compact block; the second SHOULD therefore costs one Tx query per transaction of the block.
A Tx query issued at a time fixed by the completion of the range in which its transaction was detected is correlated in time with that range; under network privacy with separate connections, the times in L still link the two (Theorem 8.8(iii)). A delay drawn independently of that completion time would remove the correlation. No ZIP specifies one for transaction queries, and no stated design fixes its law: an open problem (Definition 1.1).
Let the wallet submit a transaction by Submit on a connection c to its synchronisation server. The server then holds the complete transaction before it is broadcast, at a time in L , on a connection with endpoint E c . Without separation at the network layer it links the transaction to that endpoint and to the other queries of the same connection or endpoint, among them the birthday bound, the range bounds and the transaction queries of the session. The disclosure lies outside the goal of ZIP 307 and inside the view of Theorem 8.8.
The transaction, its time and its connection are components of the view; the statement is an instance of Theorem 8.8(i). □
The server’s operator terminates the transport, so channel encryption such as TLS protects queries from third parties and not from the server. Every connection exposes to the server its endpoint E c and its open and close times, the endpoint being the wallet’s network address or that of an exit of an anonymity network or of a proxy. Without network privacy E c is a component common to all sessions of one wallet, which is why the unlinkability goal of ZIP 307, “Security Model”, assumes network privacy.
Let submission and synchronisation use connections whose endpoints are drawn independently, as separate anonymity-network circuits give; or let submission go to a server that does not share its view with the synchronisation server, in which case the Submit query is absent from that server’s view and the separation rests on that non-collusion assumption. Then the endpoint no longer links the Submit query to the synchronisation session. Correlation remains through the times in L ; through content, the anchor and expiry heights of the transaction against the range bounds of the session; and through application-level identifiers, such as a later Status query for the submitted transaction identifier on the synchronisation connection. For payments the separation is designed but unspecified (Definition 1.1). For migration transactions ZIP 318 specifies the network-privacy step (“Network-layer privacy”: the wallet MUST offer Tor and, where available, Nym, and MAY broadcast through a server other than the synchronisation server) and the separation in time of synchronisation from broadcast (“Decoupling synchronization from broadcast”).
The endpoint components of the two connections are independent, so their joint law is the same whether or not the connections belong to one wallet; every other component of L is unchanged, and the remaining channels are those components (Theorem 8.8(iii)). In the second case the synchronisation server’s view contains no Submit query, and under non-collusion the other server’s view is not joined to it. □
Table 5 lists the observables of the server, what each reveals, its mitigation and the class of that mitigation (Definition 1.1). The interface of Definition 5.10 omits mempool queries, so no row concerns the mempool.
| Observable | Reveals | Mitigation | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| Network endpoint and connection times | network location and activity windows | network anonymity (Proposition 8.22) | designed but unspecified; specified for migration broadcasts (ZIP 318) |
| Least requested height | an upper bound on the birthday (Proposition 8.12) | a start at Sapling activation, at the cost of Proposition 6.17 | specified for an imported seed (ZIP 307) |
| Range bounds and order | resume height and scan state (Proposition 8.13) | bucketing of the start (Construction 8.16) | specified (ZIP 307) |
| Out-of-order completion ranges | the subtree of a detected note (Proposition 8.15) | none | open problem; the leak is inferred |
| Transaction queries | the transactions of interest (Proposition 8.18) | decoys and whole-block fetches (SHOULD) | specified (ZIP 307) |
| Submission | the transaction before broadcast, linked to its session (Proposition 8.21) | separate circuits | designed but unspecified |
| Transparent-address queries | the addresses, by declaration (§8.2) | one address per query at exponential times in random order (Proposition 8.11); linkage by connection and timing remains | designed but unspecified |
| Pool sets of range queries | if narrowed by wallet state, the height at which the Orchard-pool balance became known to be zero (Corollary 8.9) | one pool set fixed independently of receipts; only trial decryption omitted | designed but unspecified |
Every row of Table 5 is a component of L or of the transport metadata (Theorem 8.8); none is a function of the content of compact blocks (Corollary 8.9). The size of each leak depends on policies that the protocol leaves open: beyond the rules of ZIP 307 and the migration schedule of ZIP 318, no ZIP fixes the scheduling policy of a wallet.